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BEYOND BALANCING:   
RETHINKING THE LAW OF 
 EMBRYO DISPOSITION 
MARY ZIEGLER* 
Actress Sofia Vergara became the center of a new round of conflict about the 
disposition of embryos created using assisted reproductive technologies (ART):  the 
conflict about the difference that abortion jurisprudence should make to case law on 
ART.  This Article argues that the history of abortion jurisprudence sheds light on 
the problems with the leading approach to embryo-disposition cases like Vergara’s. 
In many instances, courts first look for a clear, binding agreement and look 
to a balancing analysis if no such agreement exists.  As this Article shows, this 
is not the first time that courts have applied a balancing analysis to deal with 
clashing rights to seek and avoid genetic parenthood.  The Article explores the history 
of two balancing approaches that have played a pivotal role in abortion law.  These 
approaches have led to inconsistent results and cater to the prejudices of judges who 
are asked to weigh the relative merits of individual parties’ views on reproduction. 
This Article recommends that states adopt legislation detailing the requirements 
of an enforceable embryo disposition similar to the Uniform Premarital and 
Marital Agreements Act (UPMAA).  In the embryo-disposition context, states 
should require parties to disclose legal rights and responsibilities rather than only 
finances.  These disclosures should cover the preservation, implantation, or 
destruction of the embryos and the financial and legal responsibility for any 
resulting child.  States should enforce an embryo-disposition agreement if it is 
voluntary, if the parties had counsel or the opportunity to access counsel, and if 
the parties had a full disclosure of the constitutional and common law rights 
implicated by the agreement. 
                                               
 *  Stearns Weaver Miller Professor, Florida State University College of Law.  The 
Author would like to thank Katherine Baker, Linda Fentiman, Deborah Forman, 
Melanie Jacobs, Kevin Maillard, Seema Mohapatra, Mark Spottswood, and Hannah 
Wiseman for agreeing to help with earlier versions of this piece. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sofia Vergara’s legal troubles have revitalized interest in the law 
surrounding embryo disposition.1  Vergara’s ex-fiancé, Nick Loeb, 
brought national attention to the issue in 2015 when he filed a lawsuit 
to protect and bring to term, two female embryos created by Loeb and 
Vergara during their relationship.2  The couple had used in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) in the hope of later having a child together.3  The 
pair twice attempted IVF, and as is often the case, created more 
                                               
 1. See, e.g., Leanne Aciz Stanton, Sofia Vergara Frozen Embryo Lawsuit Filed by Ex Nick 
Loeb Is Dismissed by Louisiana Judge, US WKLY. (Aug. 26, 2017), http://www. 
usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/news/sofia-vergaras-frozen-embryo-case-dismissed-
by-louisiana-judge; Brooke Stanton, Sofia Vergara and the Fraudulent Science of ‘Pre-
Embryos,’ NAT’L REV. (Sept. 5, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com 
/2017/09/sofia-vergara-embryos-pre-embryos-fraudulent-science-lawsuit-nick-loeb; 
Louisiana Judge Rules Sofia Vergara’s Frozen Embryos Are ‘Citizens of California,’ WOMEN IN 
THE WORLD (Aug. 30, 2017), https://womenintheworld.com/2017/08/30/sofia-
vergara-picks-up-major-legal-victory-in-bitter-dispute-over-frozen-embryos. 
 2. Nick Loeb, Opinion, Sofía Vergara’s Ex-Fiancé:  Our Frozen Embryos Have a Right 
to Live, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/opinion/ 
sofiavergaras-ex-fiance-our-frozen-embryos-have-a-right-to-live.html. 
 3. Id. 
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embryos than would be implanted at a specific time.4  Couples like 
Loeb and Vergara often sign consent forms addressing disputes 
between patients and fertility clinics, but Loeb and Vergara had no 
agreement spelling out what would happen if they broke up.5  In 2014, 
their relationship ended; Loeb, seeking to use the embryos, filed a 
lawsuit to obtain custody of two embryos called Emma and Isabella.6 
Because of Vergara’s celebrity, Loeb quickly found a national 
audience.  He penned a New York Times op-ed on what he saw as “fathers’ 
rights.”7  Notably, Loeb also connected his case to the constitutional law 
governing abortion.8  He wrote, “[a] woman is entitled to bring a 
pregnancy to term even if the man objects.  Shouldn’t a man who is 
willing to take on all parental responsibilities be similarly entitled to 
bring his embryos to term even if the woman objects?”9 
Loeb’s comment reflects a larger trend in cases involving the 
disposition of embryos created during IVF:  the increasing injection of 
the abortion conflict into the law and politics of assisted reproductive 
technologies (ART).10  Pro-life organizations have formed groups 
committed to the legal defense or adoption of embryos.11  Groups like 
the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), which have previously 
avoided the issue, have spoken out more forcefully against those 
seeking to discard embryos.12 
                                               
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  On the use of consent forms by couples going through IVF, see Deborah 
L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce:  Why Clinic Consent Forms Are Not the Answer, 
24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 57, 58–60 (2011), discussing the inherent problems that 
arise when clinic consent forms regarding the disposition of frozen embryos upon 
death or divorce of the progenitors are considered enforceable contracts. 
 6. Loeb, supra note 2. 
 7. Id.; see also Stanton, supra note 1 (referring to the controversy as “[t]he case of 
Emma and Isabella versus Sofia Vergara”). 
 8. See Loeb, supra note 2 (“Does one person’s desire to avoid biological parenthood . . . 
outweigh another’s religious beliefs in the sanctity of life and desire to be a parent?”). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See infra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 11. On the work of organizations involved in embryo defense or embryo adoption, 
see EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CTR., https://www.embryoadoption.org (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2018); EMBRYO DEF., http://embryodefense.org (last visited Dec. 3, 2018); 
Snowflakes Embryo Adoption Program, NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, 
https://www.nightlight.org/snowflakes-embryo-adoption-donation/embryo-adoption 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018). 
 12. See, e.g., Marilyn Synek, A Person Is a Person No Matter How Small (or Frozen), NAT’L 
RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS TODAY (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.nationalrighttolifenews.org/ 
news/2015/01/a-person-is-a-person-no-matter-how-small-or-frozen (describing Synek’s 
personal connection to the frozen embryo issue).  But see Rebecca Taylor, What Is the Pro-
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This Article argues that the history of abortion doctrine sheds light on 
the problems with the leading approach to embryo-disposition cases like 
Vergara and Loeb’s.  In many instances, courts first look for a clear, 
binding agreement between the parties and resort to a balancing 
analysis if no such agreement exists.13  As this Article shows, this is not 
the first time that courts have applied a balancing analysis to deal with 
clashing rights to seek and avoid genetic parenthood.  This Article 
explores the history of two balancing approaches that played a pivotal 
role in abortion law.  First, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, pro-lifers, 
convinced that Roe v. Wade14 would soon be overruled, stressed the need 
for courts to balance a woman’s reasons for seeking an abortion against 
a man’s interest in becoming a father.15  Second, in the aftermath of the 
Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,16 the lower courts 
adopted a balancing approach when determining whether regulations 
unduly burden women’s rights to choose abortion.17 
The historical application of these balancing tests illuminates serious 
problems attached to the balancing of competing interests in the 
context of ART.  First, these tests have led to inconsistent results. 
Second, they cater to the prejudices of judges who are asked to weigh 
                                               
Life Catholic View of Human Embryo Adoption?, LIFENEWS.COM (June 29, 2011, 12:22 PM), 
http://www.lifenews.com/2011/06/29/what-is-the-pro-life-catholic-view-of-human-emb 
ryo-adoption (discussing differing opinions among Catholic pro-life supporters about 
the morality of embryo adoption). 
 13. Many courts follow this approach.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, No. 
15CA0990, 2016 WL 6123561, at *4–6 (Colo. App. Oct. 20, 2016) (ruling that the 
couple’s embryo storage contract required the court to balance the parties’ competing 
interests and in so doing award the embryos to the husband), cert. granted, No. 
16SC906, 2017 WL 1377942 (Colo. Apr. 17, 2017); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179–
82 (N.Y. 1998) (upholding the parties’ agreement signed prior to embryo storage 
stipulating that, in the event of divorce, pre-embryos would be donated to the IVF 
program); In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 840–42 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (ruling in 
favor of the wife because the couple’s prior agreement had designated the wife as the 
decision maker); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598–605 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that, 
in the absence of an agreement, the husband’s interest in avoiding procreation 
weighed more heavily than the wife’s interest in wanting to donate embryos to another 
couple); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 48–55 (Tex. App. 2006) (enforcing the 
couple’s written agreement to discard the embryos following divorce if the parties are 
unable to agree on the disposition of the remaining embryos). 
 14. 410. U.S. 113 (1973). 
 15. See infra Section II.A (discussing the pro-life movement’s promotion of a 
balancing analysis as a strategy for overruling Roe v. Wade). 
 16. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 17. See infra Section II.B (discussing abortion rights activists’ insistence on an 
undue burden balancing test that has led to inconsistent outcomes). 
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the relative merits of individual parties’ views on reproduction.  As long 
as a balancing approach applies to embryo disputes, couples will be 
exposed to humiliating, open-court discussions of their private lives 
and judicial evaluation of the merits of their opinions on parenthood.18  
Those using ART will also lack badly needed guidance about what will 
happen in the event of a dispute. 
Courts gravitate toward balancing tests largely because of problems 
with any potential contract between the parties or the absence of any 
agreement whatsoever.19  But, instead of abandoning a contract 
approach, lawmakers should do more to ensure that couples’ 
agreements on embryo disposition are meaningful and informed.  This 
Article recommends that states adopt legislation detailing the 
requirements of an enforceable embryo disposition agreement similar 
to the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act (UPMAA).20  
The parallels between prenuptial agreements and embryo-disposition 
agreements are significant. The law on embryo-disposition contracts 
should reflect both the similarities and differences between the two 
types of bargain.  In the embryo-disposition context, states should 
require parties to disclose legal rights and responsibilities, rather than 
only finances. These disclosures should cover the preservation, 
implantation, and destruction of the embryos and the financial and 
legal responsibility for any resulting child.  Concerns about substantive 
unconscionability, most of which touch on financial unfairness to one 
party in the prenuptial context,21 are out of place when it comes to the 
disposition of embryos.  Indeed, asking the courts to weigh in on substantive 
unconscionability could create the same problems as balancing tests by 
inviting judges to dissect the parties’ motives and personal lives.22  States 
                                               
 18. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, 2016 WL 6123561, at *6–9 (upholding the 
trial court’s finding that the wife’s desire to have a fourth child did not outweigh the 
husband’s desire not to father additional children with her and thus experience the 
moral and social obligation that would accompany another biological child); Davis, 
842 S.W.2d at 603–04 (holding that the husband’s desire to avoid additional financial 
responsibilities and his opposition to fathering a child that would have to live in a 
single-parent setting weighed more heavily than the wife’s interest in wanting to 
donate embryos to another couple). 
 19. See Forman, supra note 5, at 61–62 (describing the Davis balancing test as “a last resort”). 
 20. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/premarital%20and%20marital%20agree
ments/2012_pmaa_final.pdf. 
 21. Ian Smith, The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts, 17 J. ECON. SURVS. 201, 
215 (2003).  
 22. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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should determine that an embryo-disposition agreement is enforceable if it 
is voluntary, if the parties had counsel or had the opportunity to access 
counsel, and if the parties had a full disclosure of the constitutional and 
common-law rights implicated by the agreement. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I canvasses the current law 
on embryo disposition, focusing on legal and political trends in recent 
years that have knit ART and abortion law more closely together.  Part 
II puts these doctrinal developments in historical context, by studying 
past efforts to use balancing to resolve rights to seek and avoid 
parenthood. These cases provide a fascinating parallel to 
contemporary embryo-disposition suits:  at the time, when many 
believed that the Supreme Court would overrule Roe very soon, courts 
could freely balance competing values and commitments to 
procreation.23  As Part II shows, “fathers’ rights” litigation offered courts 
several reasons for avoiding a balancing analyses that reach beyond 
abortion case law.24  Part III begins to develop an alternative approach 
by studying the similarities between prenuptial and embryo-disposition 
agreements.25  Part III then proposes and defends a model approach.26   
I.    THE NEW LAW OF EMBRYO DISPOSITION 
Embryo disposition has become one of the most widely-discussed 
issues involving reproductive health.  Cases like Vergara’s frequently 
make front-page news.27  In recent years, organizations like Embryo 
Defense have formed to fund litigation and public education on the 
rights some assign to pre-embryos created during IVF.28  Other 
                                               
 23. See infra Section II.A. 
 24. See infra notes 177–183, 208–216 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra Section III.A. 
 26. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 27. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Laurie J. Pawlitza, Battle over 
Embryo Highlights Family Law’s New Fertility Frontier, FIN. POST (Sept. 5, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://business.financialpost.com/personal-finance/battle-over-embryo-highlights-
family-laws-new-fertility-frontier (examining a dispute arising in Canada over embryos 
purchased from Georgia with no biological relation to either spouse); Julia Marsh, 
Woman Must Turn over Embryo for Estranged Hubby to Destroy:  Judges, N.Y. POST (June 5, 
2018, 7:34 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/06/05/woman-must-turn-over-embryo-for-
estranged-hubby-to-destroy-judges (noting that the judge’s decision was based on the 
contract that the couple had signed that “allowed either party to revoke their consent 
to use the embryo at any time”).  
 28. See EMBRYO DEF., supra note 11 (featuring “resource[s] for all parents, 
advocates, lawyers, and anybody interested in saving frozen embryos”). 
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organizations have specialized in embryo adoption.29  The Snowflakes 
Embryo Adoption Program, founded in 1998, facilitated the first 
embryo adoption30 and more recently, the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services’ Office of Population Affairs has provided 
grants to increase awareness of embryo adoption as an option.31 
From the outset, the relationship between embryo disposition and 
abortion was complex.  In the mid-1980s, when the Vatican took a 
strong stand against IVF and other assisted reproductive technologies, 
most anti-abortion and social-conservative groups stayed on the 
sidelines.32  While never focusing on IVF, pro-life groups have 
consistently opposed selective reduction,33 a procedure in which a 
doctor implants more embryos than are expected to be born and then 
aborts some fetuses to maximize the chances that others will come to 
term.34  Abortion opponents and some disability-rights groups have 
also opposed prenatal genetic diagnosis involved in ART, believing 
that it leads families to end pregnancies.35  While judges have created 
                                               
 29. See EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CTR., supra note 11 (promoting embryo 
adoption as a “proven successful process allowing families with remaining embryos to 
donate them to another family desiring to experience pregnancy and childbirth”); 
NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, supra note 11 (assisting adoptive families to “use . . . 
donated embryos to achieve a pregnancy and give birth to their adopted child”). 
 30. Why Choose Snowflakes?, NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, https://www.night 
light.org/snowflakes-embryo-adoption-donation/embryo-adoption/why-choose-snowflakes 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018). 
 31. Embryo Adoption, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/opa/about-opa/embryo-adoption (last visited Dec. 3, 2018). 
 32. See, e.g., Robin Toner, The Vatican’s Doctrine:  Political Impact; Contrast to Abortion Is 
Discerned, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/ 12/us/the-
vatican-s-doctrine-political-impact-contrast-to-abortion-issue-is-discerned.html (observing 
that the complex ethical questions posed by ART precluded the emergence of a powerful 
consensus on the right akin to that witnessed during the abortion debate). 
 33. See, e.g., Liza Mundy, Too Much to Carry?, WASH. POST (May 20, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/15/AR2007051 
501730.html (arguing against the termination of any life following conception unless 
the mother’s life is at risk); Alan L. Otten, Technological Advances in the Science of Birth 
Alter the Setting of High Court’s Abortion Ruling, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1989, at A16 (noting 
ART’s dilemma causing potential to both create a baby and encourage the abortion of 
fetuses in order to promote the long-term viability of others). 
 34. See Stacey Pinchuk, A Difficult Choice in a Different Voice:  Multiple Births, Selective 
Reduction and Abortion, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 29, 30–31 (2000) (describing the 
medical procedures involved in selective reductions). 
 35. See, e.g., Kim Painter, How Much Do You Want to Know?  Doctors Have Prenatal Tests 
for 450 Genetic Diseases, USA TODAY, Aug. 15, 1997, at A1 (citing opponents’ view that 
“testing itself is not the problem,” but rather what is often done based on the test results). 
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rules that apply only to assisted reproduction, abortion law still casts a 
shadow over ART jurisprudence.36 
Courts could choose to apply abortion doctrine to resolve ART 
disputes, as Professor Judith Daar has recommended.37  In fact, on 
some matters, abortion doctrine has strongly influenced embryo-
disposition cases.  For example, abortion jurisprudence encouraged 
courts to view an embryo as neither a person nor a piece of property.38  
For the most part, however, courts have used ART cases as an 
opportunity to rethink the rights at stake in assisted reproduction and 
to create a better approach to clashing views about parenthood.39 
Courts have created three main approaches to embryo-disposition 
cases:  a balancing analysis40; a contract-based approach;41 and the 
mutual, contemporaneous agreement approach.42  This Part surveys 
each of these approaches and the arguments often used for and against 
them.  This survey shows that notwithstanding criticisms of a balancing 
analysis, courts continue to adopt similar approaches because the 
                                               
 36. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Abortion and the Constitutional Right (Not) to Procreate, 48 
U. RICH. L. REV. 1263, 1263–64 (2014) (warning that, although “abortion case law may 
provide the strongest constitutional foundation for [those] seeking rights to access 
ART or avoid unwanted parenthood[,] . . . abortion jurisprudence carries normative 
and political baggage”). 
 37. See generally Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy 
Process:  Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 
455, 458–69 (1999) (disputing court rulings that embryo disposition does not 
implicate women’s constitutional right to privacy or bodily integrity in the context of 
reproductive choice and applying the abortion rights framework to pre-embryos). 
 38. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774–76 (Iowa 2003) 
(observing that “the factors that are relevant in determining the custody of children 
in dissolution cases are simply not useful” in the ART context); McQueen v. Gadberry, 
507 S.W.3d 127, 141–49 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (classifying pre-embryos as “marital 
property of a special character”); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594–97 (Tenn. 1992) 
(concluding that pre-embryos “occupy an interim category that entitles them to special 
respect because of their potential for human life”). 
 39. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 40. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, No. 15CA0990, 2016 WL 6123561, at *6 (Colo. 
App. Oct. 20, 2016) (ruling that the couple’s embryo-disposition agreement required 
the court to balance the parties’ competing interests); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (using 
a balancing approach where spouses had not agreed on disposition of embryos in the 
event of divorce). 
 41. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179–80 (N.Y. 1998) (looking to the 
parties’ agreement to determine the disposition of disputed embryos). 
 42. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 783 (holding that in the absence 
of mutual, contemporaneous consent, embryos are to remain in storage with the party 
opposing destruction paying storage fees). 
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parties lack a convincing contract and because the gravity of the 
interests involved, both constitutional and otherwise. 
A.   Davis and the Balancing Approach 
Davis v. Davis,43 the foundational case articulating a balancing 
approach, stemmed from the divorce of Mary Sue and Junior Davis.44  
The Davises previously pursued IVF after struggling to get pregnant.45  
Optimistic about the outcome, Mary Sue and Junior did not discuss or 
agree on the disposition of excess pre-embryos.46  After one attempt at 
implantation failed, Junior filed for divorce,47 and Mary Sue requested 
custody of the pre-embryos.48  The trial court found that the pre-
embryos were children and awarded custody to Mary Sue.49  The 
Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, holding that abortion 
doctrine—particularly the holding in Roe that a fetus was not a 
person—contradicted the trial court’s ruling.50  Mary Sue appealed this 
decision to the Tennessee Supreme Court.51 
But what is a pre-embryo?  To answer this question, the court first 
examined state and federal law and found little support for the idea that 
an embryo was a person.52  However, the Tennessee Supreme Court also 
found it unconvincing to describe an embryo as property.53  Relying on 
ethical guidance from the American Fertility Society, the court 
identified a middle-ground position:  an embryo deserves special respect 
because of its “potential to become a person,” but it should not be 
treated the same as an actual person.54  In resolving embryo-disposition 
cases, the court articulated a preference for relying on contracts 
                                               
 43. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 44. Id. at 592. 
 45. Id. at 591. 
 46. Id. at 592. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 589. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 
1990) (examining Tennessee statutes that incorporate the Roe trimester framework); 
see also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594–95. 
 51. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589–90. 
 52. See id. at 594–95 (affirming the Court of Appeals’s finding that pre-embryos are 
not protected as persons under state or federal law). 
 53. See id. at 595–97. 
 54. Id. at 596 (quoting Ethics Comm. Am. Fertility Soc’y, Ethical Considerations of 
the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY S1, S35 (Supp. 2 June 1990)). 
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between the parties.55  This preference reflected “the proposition that 
the progenitors, having provided the gametic material giving rise to the 
pre-embryos, retain decision making authority as to their disposition.”56 
But there was no clear agreement between Junior and Mary Sue, and 
the court refused to read the couple’s very willingness to do IVF as an 
implied contract.57  The court instead concluded that it had no choice 
but to balance the parties’ interests in seeking or avoiding procreation.58  
Citing cases on contraception, abortion, and parental rights and 
responsibilities, the court concluded that “the right of procreational 
autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance—the right to 
procreate and the right to avoid procreation.”59  In the IVF context, the 
rights at issue differ from those that apply in the abortion context.60  In 
abortion jurisprudence, because only women (and trans-men) can 
become pregnant, concerns about women’s bodily integrity justified 
more decision-making authority.61  No similar physical limitations 
governed IVF.62  In the context of ART, as the court in Davis reasoned, 
a court should look closely at each party’s reasons for seeking and 
avoiding genetic parenthood.63 
The court then applied this approach to the facts of Davis.  Having 
grown up in a home for abandoned children, Junior strongly opposed 
raising a child in a home with only one parent.64  On the other hand, 
Mary Sue wanted to donate the embryos to another couple to ensure 
that the difficulties she had endured during the IVF process were not 
in vain.65  The Davis court reasoned that Junior’s interest in avoiding 
parenthood outweighed Mary Sue’s desire to give the embryos to an 
                                               
 55. See id. at 597 (“We believe, as a starting point, that an agreement regarding 
disposition of any untransferred pre-embryos in the event of contingencies . . . should 
be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the progenitors.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 598. 
 58. See id. at 603 (“One way of resolving these disputes is to consider the positions 
of the parties, the significance of their interests, and the relative burdens that will be 
imposed by differing resolutions.”). 
 59. Id. at 601 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 60. See id. (noting the “inherent tension” between the two rights in the IVF context). 
 61. See id. (emphasizing that such concerns “precluded men from controlling 
abortion decisions”). 
 62. See id. (viewing Mary Sue and Junior as “entirely equivalent gamete-providers” 
in the embryo-disposition analysis). 
 63. Id. at 602–03. 
 64. Id. at 604. 
 65. Id. 
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infertile couple.66  Had Mary Sue wished to use the embryos herself, 
the Davis court would have allowed her to do so over Junior’s objection 
only if doing so was her only way to become a parent.67  Since Mary Sue 
could adopt, the court reasoned that her interest in seeking 
reproduction was less significant than Junior’s interest in avoiding it.68 
The Davis court, in some ways, seemed to reach a satisfactory 
outcome.  Since few couples entered into meaningful written 
agreements before availing themselves of IVF, a balancing analysis 
seemed to be an important safety net in embryo disputes.  Moreover, 
since both the right to procreate and to avoid procreation were 
arguably at stake in IVF cases, a balancing approach allowed courts to 
give each interest proper respect all the while paying attention to the 
specifics of each claimant’s circumstances.69  Indeed, Davis’s approach 
did attract adherents, as illustrated by the New York Court of Appeals’s 
decision in Kass v. Kass.70 
B.   Kass and the Contract-Based Approach 
While Davis praised a contract-based approach, Kass became the first 
to apply it.71  Kass also involved a married couple who had struggled to 
conceive.72  Maureen and Steve Kass enrolled in an IVF program at 
John T. Mather Memorial Hospital.73  To participate in the program, the 
couple had to sign four forms.74  In an addendum to one form, the two 
elected to have the excess eggs inseminated and cryopreserved for 
possible future use by the couple.75  Maureen and Steve completed an 
additional consent form discussing what would happen in the event of 
the couple’s death or “other unforeseen circumstances,” and decided to 
allow the IVF program to use the remaining embryos for research.76  The 
Kasses tried IVF using Maureen’s sister as a surrogate, but the procedure 
                                               
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 70. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). 
 71. See Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice:  An 
Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 72–73 (1999) 
(acknowledging that Kass is the only other decision from a state’s high court to address 
the issue of pre-embryo disposition). 
 72. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 176. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 176–77. 
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failed, and the two subsequently filed for divorce.77  Maureen sought sole 
custody of the embryos, which she planned to have implanted.78 
The trial court looked to abortion jurisprudence to evaluate the 
Kasses’ dispute.79  The court reasoned that just as a pregnant woman had 
sole decision-making authority in the context of ending a pregnancy, an 
infertile woman should determine what happened to fertilized 
embryos.80  A divided Appellate Division reversed.81  The New York 
Court of Appeals reiterated the value of written contracts in embryo-
disposition matters.82  The court explained that prior written agreements 
“both minimize misunderstandings and maximize procreative liberty by 
reserving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the first 
instance a quintessentially personal, private decision.”83 
The court then set out an approach to the interpretation of embryo-
disposition contracts:  judges should discern the parties’ “overall intention” 
and then construe a contract accordingly.84  Notwithstanding some 
ambiguity in the contract, the court concluded that its overall intent was for 
the parties to make a joint decision about the disposition of the embryos 
and to make the embryos available for research in the event of divorce, as 
well as the specifically enumerated “unforeseen circumstances.”85 
The Kass approach appealed to many courts tackling embryo 
disposition as a matter of first impression.86  It seemed intuitively right 
to allow the parties to reach their own decision about embryo 
disposition rather than asking the court to balance the competing 
                                               
 77. Id. at 177. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Kass v. Kass, No. 95-02615, 1995 WL 110368, at *1–3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995). 
 80. See id. at *3 (asserting that conception by IVF does not give rise to new rights 
on behalf of the father and therefore making the wife’s interest paramount). 
 81. Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
 82. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 
1992)) (“Agreements between progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition 
of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in 
any dispute between them . . . .”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 181. 
 85. See id. (reviewing the multiple consent forms signed by the couple as a whole). 
 86. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 840–41 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) 
(adopting the Davis and Kass framework of enforcing the intent of the progenitors’ 
advance agreement); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 270–71 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) 
(bypassing the issue of whether the pre-embryos were “children” and basing its 
decision “solely upon the contractual rights of the parties under the pre-embryo 
cryopreservation contract”). 
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interests and reach an outcome.87  Many couples entered into an 
agreement with fertility clinics before beginning IVF, and these 
documents provided some guidance for judges.88  Still, due to the 
dissatisfaction with Kass, other courts continued to search for an 
alternative approach.89 
C.   Witten and Mutual, Contemporaneous Consent 
The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage of Witten90 
reflects discontent with the contract-centered approaches articulated 
in both Davis and Kass.91  Trip and Tamera Witten had unsuccessfully 
tried to procreate using IVF, and after Trip filed for divorce, Tamara 
sought custody of the embryos.92  The Wittens had executed an agreement 
with the University of Nebraska Medical Center, which provided that the 
embryos would not be released for use without the consent of both 
parties.93  The only exception covered the death of Trip and/or Tamara.94  
The trial court relied on this agreement in determining what should 
happen to the embryos, and held that neither side could transfer or 
otherwise dispose of the embryos without the other’s written consent.95  
The Iowa Supreme Court rejected this approach.96 
The court concluded that the parties’ agreement was broad enough 
to cover the parties’ divorce,97 but avoided the contract-based approach 
                                               
 87. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (“To the extent possible, it should be the 
progenitors—not the State and not the courts—who by their prior directive make this 
deeply personal life choice.”). 
 88. Forman, supra note 5, at 58–59 (noting that it is common practice for IVF clinics 
to require consent forms and the initial determination of courts to view them as binding). 
 89. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 71, at 88–89 (criticizing the Kass contract 
approach for failing to take into account the “contemporaneous wishes, values, and 
beliefs” of the parties). 
 90. 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
 91. See id. at 781–82 (finding that it was against public policy “to enforce a prior 
agreement between the parties in this highly personal area of reproductive choice 
when one of the parties has changed his or her mind concerning the disposition or 
use of the embryos”). 
 92. Id. at 772. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 773. 
 96. See id. at 783 (rejecting the contract approach but affirming the trial court’s ruling 
that the embryos could not be used or transferred without the consent of both parties). 
 97. Id. at 773 (noting that the agreement did not expressly address disposition upon 
divorce but finding that it was encompassed by the general provision “release of embryos”). 
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for policy reasons.98  Given the importance of reproductive decisions, 
the court reasoned that individuals had the right to make decisions 
that align with their present-day values.99  Further, the court stated that 
individuals would perform particularly poorly when predicting their 
decisions about major, distant events like parenthood.100  The Witten 
court also criticized a pure balancing test and suggested that, in 
applying such a test, courts would too often substitute their views for 
those of the parties.101 
As an alternative, the court adopted a mutual, contemporaneous 
consent approach.  Under this approach, no embryo will be used, 
destroyed, or donated without the consent of both parties who created 
the embryo.102  If the couple could not reach an agreement, the status 
quo of preservation would prevail regardless of any prior agreement.103 
In Witten, the court prioritized the parties’ present-day desire (or 
lack thereof) to seek out parenthood.  In principle, allowing parties to 
avoid unwanted parenthood is just and sensible, and mutual, 
contemporaneous consent provides a mechanism whereby parties can 
resolve embryo disputes amongst themselves.104  In practice, as a 
dispute resolution mechanism, mutual, contemporaneous consent 
seems far less than pragmatic.  By the time the parties have dug in and 
embraced litigation, it is quite unlikely that anyone will reach a 
present-day consensus.  Partly for this reason, balancing analyses have 
become increasingly significant. 
                                               
 98. Id. at 780–82. 
 99. See id. at 783 (concluding that one party can withdraw from a prior agreement 
after clearly expressing to the other party that “the agreement no longer reflects his 
or her current values or wishes”). 
 100. See id. at 778 (“One’s erroneous prediction of how she or he will feel about the 
matter at some point in the future can have grave repercussions.”). 
 101. See id. at 779 (arguing that the same policy concerns precluding the enforcement 
of contracts against progenitors who have changed their minds also support the position 
that judges should not substitute their own decisions for that of the progenitors). 
 102. See id. at 782–83 (recognizing that a prior agreement can still serve as guidance 
for the parties until a party declares an objection to the agreement). 
 103. Id. at 783. 
 104. See id. at 783 (providing that the embryos will not be transferred, released, 
disposed of, or used without signed consent from both parties and that, if the parties 
cannot reach an agreement, the embryos will be preserved indefinitely, with the party 
opposing disposition bearing the costs). 
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D.   The Prominence of Balancing 
Most courts that have heard embryo-disposition disputes have 
adopted a version of the Davis and Kass approaches, applying a valid 
contract if possible and balancing the parties’ interests if no viable 
agreement was in place.105  Notwithstanding a stated preference for a 
contract-based approach, many states have had to turn to a balancing 
test.106  When an agreement does exist, courts have hesitated to bind 
parties to them, especially since many of the forms do not specifically 
contemplate divorce.107  Given potential problems with clinic-consent 
forms, the frequency of balancing might not seem to be a bad thing.  
The informed consent documents that parties sign at clinics are often 
long and complex, combining medical and legal matters.108  Research 
suggests that couples frequently change their minds after starting 
                                               
 105. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 177–78, 181 (N.Y. 1998) (recognizing the 
Davis balancing approach but enforcing the intent of the parties found in the contract 
agreement); In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 840–41 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) 
(adopting the Davis and Kass framework resulting in the enforcement of the 
progenitors advance agreement); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) 
(noting that a “prior agreement concerning disposition should be carried out,” but in 
the absence of an agreement, “the relative interests of the parties . . . must be 
weighed”); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006) (enforcing the voluntary 
contractual agreement that explicitly dealt with the issue of disposition upon divorce). 
 106. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, No. 15CA0990, 2016 WL 6123561, at *4–5 
(Colo. App. Oct. 20, 2016) (applying the balancing approach after finding that the 
written agreement expressly left the determination of disposition to the court); 
Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1161–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (holding that 
advance agreements are enforceable but adopting a balancing approach in the 
absence of such agreement); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 714–15, 719–20 (N.J. 2001) 
(finding that the written agreement did not contemplate divorce and resorting to a 
balancing test to determine disposition); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1136 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2012) (adopting the balancing approach after determining that the disposition 
agreement was not enforceable due to the parties’ lack of signature on the 
agreement); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1091–93 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) 
(declining to read an implied willingness to continue with procreation upon divorce 
into the contract and implementing a balancing test to determine disposition), rev’d, 
48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002). 
 107. See, e.g., Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1154–55 (finding that an informed consent 
form did not serve as an advanced agreement modifying the parties’ oral contract); 
J.B., 783 A.2d at 714–15 (determining that the contract did not specifically address 
disposition upon divorce, but rather left it to the court’s determination); Reber, 42 A.3d 
at 1136 (refusing to enforce the agreement because it was not signed by the parties). 
 108. See Forman, supra note 5, at 69 (commenting that the large amount of 
information on consent forms can hinder decision-making). 
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treatment.109  The circumstances surrounding the signing of an 
informed consent form suggest that at least some couples sign papers 
without even reading the contracts.110 
Mutual, contemporaneous consent, while attractive in theory, almost 
inevitably favors the party who is happy with the status quo.  Some couples 
will certainly be able to agree on the disposition of embryos after splitting 
up.  But for many, there will never be any mutual, contemporaneous 
consent.  In these scenarios, parties avoiding procreation will 
systematically do better than those seeking procreation.111  While this may 
be a desirable result, the mutual, contemporaneous consent approach 
does not force courts to grapple with whether one of the two related 
procreative rights should outweigh the other.112 
Is a balancing test the lesser of all evils?  Part II addresses this question 
by studying the history of a similar balancing approach in the abortion 
context.  Part II first examines pro-life efforts to convince the courts to 
adopt a balancing test when biological fathers and mothers disagree 
about abortion.113  Then Part II explores the application of a more 
recent, but less closely related, balancing approach authorized by Whole 
Woman’s Health.114  This history suggests that a balancing approach to 
ART is far more problematic than we might have imagined. 
                                               
 109. See, e.g., Susan L. Crockin, The “Embryo” Wars:  At the Epicenter of Science, Law, 
Religion, and Politics, 39 FAM. L.Q. 599, 615–16 (2005) (citing a 2003 study finding that 
seventy-one percent of patients contacted at least three years after freezing their 
embryos changed their initial dispositional choice).  Research also suggested that fifty 
to seventy-five percent of patients who initially express a desire to donate excess 
embryos do not ultimately choose to do so.  Id.; see also Susan C. Klock et al., The 
Disposition of Unused Frozen Embryos, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 69, 69 (2001) (explaining 
that, in a study at the IVF clinic at Northwestern University School of Medicine, 
seventy-one percent of couples changed their disposition choice after three months); 
C.R. Newton et al., Changes in Patient Preferences in the Disposal of Cryopreserved Embryos, 
22 HUM. REPROD. 3124, 3124 (2007) (“[A] willingness to donate embryos for research 
purposes declined once couples had ended their participation in IVF compared with 
attitudes before treatment.”). 
 110. See Forman, supra note 5, at 75–76 (explaining that, while no empirical study 
exists, evidence from adjudicated cases indicates that it is not uncommon for at least 
one party to fail to review the documents before signing). 
 111. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (“Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation 
should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving 
parenthood by means other than use of the pre[-]embryos in question.”). 
 112. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 778 (Iowa 2003) (explaining the 
contemporaneous mutual consent framework in which disagreement between 
progenitors results in maintaining the “status quo” rather than judicial intervention). 
 113. See infra Section II.A. 
 114. See infra Section II.B. 
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II.    THE PROBLEMS WITH BALANCING 
Both pro-life and abortion-rights activists have relied on balancing 
analyses in the past.115  This Part explores cases that illuminate the 
problems with adopting a similar approach in the context of ART.  
First, this Part explores how both pro-life and pro-choice activists have 
relied on balancing analyses in the past.116  Pro-life activists urged 
courts to use a balancing test when a potential father objected to an 
abortion.117  Pro-choice activists pitted a woman’s rights to choose 
against a man’s right to parent and urged courts to balance each 
potential parent’s interest in seeking or avoiding parenthood.118  Next, 
this Part examines the balancing test courts use to determine the 
constitutionality of state laws regulating a woman’s access to 
abortion.119  In Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court balanced the 
woman’s interest in receiving an abortion against any benefits of the 
regulation.120  By providing in depth case summaries, this Part 
demonstrates that each approach presents its own unique consequences 
that counsel against adopting similar approaches in the context of ART. 
A.   Balancing Men’s Rights in the Abortion Context 
In Roe, the Supreme Court held that women have a right to privacy, 
and this right includes the right to obtain an abortion.121  To determine 
whether abortion regulations violate this fundamental right, the Court 
balanced the woman’s privacy interest against the state’s interest in 
regulating abortion.122  Organized opposition to abortion reaches back 
to the 1930s and 1940s when Catholics linked anti-contraception and 
                                               
 115. See Martha Brannigan, Suits Argue Fathers’ Rights in Abortion—One Plaintiff Has 
Petitioned Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1988, at 29 (quoting the general counsel 
of the National Right to Life Committee stating that “[t]he right to an abortion is not 
an absolute one,” and explaining their litigation strategy of asking courts for a case-by-
case balancing approach of the father’s interests against the mother’s). 
 116. See infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 117. See infra notes 142–145 and accompanying text. 
 118. See infra notes 144–151 and accompanying text. 
 119. See infra notes 242–243 and accompanying text. 
 120. See infra notes 258–271 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1976) (“This right of privacy, whether it be 
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty . . . or, as the District 
Court determined in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
 122. Id. 
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anti-abortion sentiment.123  These organizations reframed their 
opposition to abortion under the Declaration of Independence and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Under 
this approach, pro-life organizations argued that both the born and 
unborn were equally entitled to legal protection.124  
After Roe, pro-lifers favored a constitutional amendment that would 
outlaw all abortions.125  However, from the beginning, abortion foes 
also looked to pass laws that would limit access to abortion and 
favorably shape public opinion.126  Statutes requiring women to obtain 
their husbands’ consent seemed to satisfy these criteria.127 
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a model 
spousal-consent statute in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth.128  In Roe, the Court specifically reserved the question of 
whether a state could require the consent of a woman’s husband,129 but 
                                               
 123. See DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, DEFENDERS OF THE UNBORN:  THE PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT 
BEFORE ROE V. WADE 4–5 (2016) (articulating the connection between the argument 
against abortion and contraception which grew into the Catholics’ argument for 
inalienable rights of an unborn fetus). 
 124. See, e.g., id.; MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE:  THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION 
DEBATE 37 (2015) (explaining the view that the Constitution contains an implied 
fundamental right to a life—a right that extends to the fetus because such supporters 
saw the fetus as a human). 
 125. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 123, at 12; ZIEGLER, supra note 124, at 37. 
 126. See Nat’l Right to Life Comm. Ad Hoc Strategy Meeting, Meeting Minutes 2–7 (Feb. 
11, 1973) (discussing legislative initiatives across the country to limit abortion and expressing 
the opinion that such initiatives keep pro-lifers “reved up” and educate the public). 
 127. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.3 (1969), invalidated by Planned Parenthood 
of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).  Rights for men struck a chord with 
leading pro-life scholars.  Roe “provided one more wedge to separate, undermine and 
ultimately destroy the nuclear family,” argued Dennis Horan, a founding member of 
Americans United for Life (AUL).  See Abortion Part IV:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Amendments of the S. Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong. 258 (1975) (statement 
of Sen. Horan).  Joseph Witherspoon, a professor at the University of Texas and 
leading NRLC member, argued that abortion violated the Thirteenth Amendment by 
taking the life of an unborn child and depriving fathers of their rights as men.  See 
Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion Part I:  Testimony Before the Subcomm. On 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong. 543 (1976) (statement 
of Rep. Witherspoon). 
 128. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 129. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973) (“Neither in this opinion nor 
in Doe v. Bolton . . . do we discuss the father’s rights, if any exist in the constitutional 
context, in the abortion decision . . . .  We are aware that some statutes recognize the 
father under certain circumstances . . . .  We need not now decide whether provisions 
of this kind are constitutional.”). 
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Danforth struck down such a requirement.130  The Court reasoned that 
if the government could not constitutionally veto a woman’s abortion 
decision in the first trimester, the state could not delegate that power 
to anyone else.131  To recognize a right for men to consent would, as 
the Danforth Court suggested, establish that abortion was not a full-
fledged constitutional right.132  While the Court suggested that women 
often did, and should, consult with their husbands, it saw the legal 
requirements quite differently.133  “The obvious fact is that when the 
wife and the husband disagree on this decision, the view of only one of 
the two marriage partners can prevail,” the Danforth Court reasoned.134  
The Court recognized that because pregnancy affects a woman more 
seriously, “the balance weighs in her favor.”135 
Despite the outcome of Danforth, pro-life groups continued looking 
for ways to give men rights in the abortion context.136  Because 
Missouri’s law awarded men an outright veto, pro-lifers hoped that a 
narrower law, or a spousal-notification statute,137 would be 
constitutional.138  Cases on the subject seemed to multiply rapidly, with 
men from Tennessee, Maryland, and Connecticut trying to stop their 
wives from having abortions.139  Seven states passed spousal-notification 
                                               
 130. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69 (“We now hold that the State may not constitutionally 
require the consent of the spouse . . . as a condition for abortion . . . .”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. at 69–71. 
 133. See id. at 71 (reasoning that the objective of preserving the marital relationship 
will not be furthered by giving a husband unlimited veto power over his wife). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See, e.g., Pamela Black, Abortion Affects Men, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1982), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/28/magazine/abortion-affects-men-too.html 
(illustrating “men’s reactions to their partners’ abortions” and the possible impact of 
spousal notification laws); Husband Challenges Wife’s Right to Abortion, 12 OFF OUR BACKS 
13, 13 (Nov. 1982) (discussing a husband who attempted to prevent his wife’s abortion 
via a court-ordered injunction). 
 137. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.735 (West 2018) (requiring the physician 
performing the abortion to “notify, if reasonably possible, the spouse of the woman 
upon whom the abortion is to be performed”); Black, supra note 136 (explaining that 
spousal-consent laws required women to obtain their husbands permission whereas 
spousal-notification laws merely required women to notify their husbands prior to 
having an abortion). 
 138. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69 (ruling that spousal-consent statutes were 
unconstitutional but giving no opinion on spousal-notification statutes). 
 139. See Husband Challenges Wife’s Right to Abortion, supra note 136, at 13. 
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laws between 1976 and 1989.140  Polls consistently suggested that a 
slight majority of Americans favored spousal-notification requirements, 
and some courts upheld them.141 
As some activists urged state legislatures to enact a spousal-
involvement statutes, two of the pro-life movement’s leading lawyers, 
James Bopp Jr. (Bopp) and Richard Coleson (Coleson), promoted a 
case-by-case balancing approach.142  Bopp and Coleson first advocated 
for a balancing approach in Smith v. Doe,143 in which John Smith (a 
pseudonym), a twenty-four-year-old delivery truck driver from Vigo 
County, Indiana, sought to stop his eighteen-year-old girlfriend from 
terminating her pregnancy.144  The two attorneys emphasized that 
Smith’s interests in protecting and acting as a father to his unborn 
child outweighed any countervailing right that Jane Doe could 
identify.145  “We think the courts have to decide how the rights of the 
father should be balanced against the rights of the mother,” Bopp 
explained.146  Bopp and Coleson claimed that a father’s interest in 
unborn children outweighed any negative consequences a woman 
might face because of an unplanned pregnancy (such as the loss of 
                                               
 140. See Barbara Ryan & Eric Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abortions:  Spousal 
Notification and Marital Interaction, 51 J. MARR. & FAM. 41, 41, 49 (1989) (Florida, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Utah). 
 141. For a more information about ongoing support for spousal-involvement laws 
for abortion, see Abortion, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018); Lydia Saad, Public Opinion on Abortion—An In-Depth Review, 
GALLUP (Jan. 22, 2002), http://news.gallup.com/poll/9904/public-opinion-about-
abortion-indepth-review.aspx. 
 142. See, e.g., Brannigan, supra note 115, at 29 (discussing Bopp’s “well-organized 
and multifaceted campaign” to bring anti-abortion cases to court); Father’s Rights at 
Issue in Abortion Case, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1988, at 3 [hereinafter Father’s Rights at Issue] 
(illustrating Bopp’s efforts to take legal action on behalf of would-be fathers 
attempting to prevent women’s abortions); Tamar Lewin, Woman Has Abortion, 
Violating Court’s Order on Paternal Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 1988), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/14/us/woman-has-abortion-violating-court-s-
order-on-paternal-rights.html (discussing men using the legal system to try to stop 
their partners’ abortions); David G. Savage, Fathers’ Appeals to Justices Ask Equal Rights to 
Children, Even Unborn, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 25, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-
09-25/news/mn-3861_1_equal-rights (noting husbands’ and wives’ competing 
interests in unborn children in a divorce dispute). 
 143. 492 U.S. 919 (1988). 
 144. See Abortion Case Sent to Lower Court, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1988, at 1; Father’s Rights 
at Issue, supra note 142; Lewin, supra note 142. 
 145. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–22, Smith v. Doe, 492 U.S. 919 (1988) (No. 88-
1837); see also Lewin, supra note 142 (emphasizing balancing the mother’s and father’s rights). 
 146. Lewin, supra note 142. 
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opportunities for further education or a career, the stigma of unwed 
motherhood, or the financial burden of raising a child, and so on).147  
Bopp and Coleson certainly wanted to help John Smith, but they 
thought that a balancing test could undermine abortion rights more 
broadly.  First, if a court looked at case-specific factors, like a woman’s 
interest in education or financial security, the availability of an 
abortion right would depend entirely on a woman’s ability to tell a story 
that was emotionally compelling to a particular judge.148  Judges’ 
prejudices or embrace of sex stereotypes would limit any applicable 
abortion right.149  Moreover, if a court suggested that men’s interests 
in parenthood outweighed at least some women’s abortion rights, then 
abortion rights would be far weaker.150  Second, the lawyers believed 
that they could package a balancing test as a modest measure, or as a 
step that a court could take without officially rejecting a constitutional 
right to abortion.151 
Additionally, Bopp and Coleson understood how going to court could 
deter women from exercising their abortion rights.  Jane Doe’s 
experience in Smith v. Doe reinforced their conclusions.  Noting that she 
would be forced to testify about her sexual history and moral positions, 
Jane Doe refused to testify.152  Ultimately, Judge Robert Howard Brown, 
of the Vigo Circuit Court, sided with Bopp and Coleson and issued an 
order blocking her from terminating her pregnancy.153  Notwithstanding 
the court’s conclusion that Roe recognized a fundamental abortion right 
for women, it found that Jane Doe did not have sufficient reasons for 
terminating her pregnancy.154  The court stated that John Smith would 
suffer considerable emotional harm if his child died, while Jane Doe 
would suffer considerably less.155  She would not suffer stigma from 
                                               
 147. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 145, at 8–22. 
 148. See Father’s Rights at Issue, supra note 142; Savage, supra note 142 (discussing a husband’s 
and wife’s competing interest in an unborn child, including the husband’s steady job). 
 149. See Father’s Rights at Issue, supra note 142. 
 150. See Brannigan, supra note 115, at 29. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 4, Smith v. Doe, 492 U.S. 919 (1988) 
(No. 88-1837); see also Lewin, supra note 142 (noting that Jane Doe’s attorneys did not 
present any evidence relating to paternity because they did not believe it was “a proper 
subject for judicial review”). 
 153. See Abortion Case Sent to Lower Court, supra note 144; Lewin, supra note 142. 
 154. See Father’s Rights at Issue, supra note 142 (quoting Bopp’s description of Jane 
Doe’s abortion reasoning process as “immature” and “frivolous”). 
 155. Lewin, supra note 142. 
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unwed motherhood and would not face “a distressful life or future.”156  
The only trauma she would face if the pregnancy came to term involved 
her desire “to look nice in a bathing suit this summer, her desire not to 
be pregnant in the summertime, and her desire not to share the 
petitioner with the baby.”157 
In opposing a subsequent petition to the United States Supreme 
Court, Jane Doe outlined some of the costs of a balancing approach.158  
Jane Doe expressed the humiliation she experienced after her 
physician was subpoenaed, attorneys debated her mental health, 
physical well-being, and sexual history, and her acquaintances testified 
in open court about her sex life.159  
While seeking expedited review from the Indiana Supreme Court, 
Jane Doe ignored the judge’s order and terminated her pregnancy.160  
Bopp and Coleson still asked the United States Supreme Court to 
review the case,161 and both parties’ filings revealed deeply different 
views about the promise of a balancing test in the abortion context.162  
Working with attorneys from Indiana and the national ACLU 
Reproductive Freedom Project, Jane Doe first argued that balancing 
presented the same problems as state-mandated spousal 
involvement.163  “Whether imposed by court order on a case-by-case 
basis or by state statute, the deprivation of a woman’s constitutional 
right is equally complete,” Jane Doe contended.164  Jane Doe reiterated 
that “[e]very adult woman has the right to decide to have an abortion 
and to effectuate that decision without government interference, 
regardless of her very personal reasons or having to reveal those 
reasons.”165  Forcing her to do otherwise, Jane Doe concluded, 
suggested that she had no constitutional abortion right.166 
                                               
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 152, at 3–5. 
 159. See id.; see also Lewin, supra note 142 (noting that the judge’s intrusion into 
Doe’s personal matters was particularly troublesome). 
 160. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 152, at 5; see also Lewin, supra note 142. 
 161. Lewin, supra note 142. 
 162. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 145; Respondent’s Brief, supra 
note 152, at 3–5. 
 163. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 152, at 7. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 8. 
 166. See id. at 7–8. 
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Further, Jane Doe suggested that balancing in the reproductive 
context was doomed from the start.167  Given the range of religious, 
medical, and personal factors in play in decisions about reproduction, 
judges applying a balancing test could too easily impose their “purely 
subjective observations and personal beliefs.”168  If the Court disagreed, 
courts would likely be flooded with “countless highly personal disputes 
involving abortion, sterilization, and the use of birth control, between 
spouses and lovers.”169  The very use of balancing might deter some 
women from exercising their reproductive rights.  Forcing a woman to 
publicly defend her private decision to terminate her pregnancy might 
tax her abortion right into non-existence.170 
Bopp and Coleson’s petition for writ of certiorari made clear that 
the adoption of a balancing test was intended to allow pro-lifers to chip 
away at abortion rights.171  First, Bopp and Coleson argued that even if 
the Constitution recognized an abortion right, it was not a strong 
one—the interest could be overcome by a significant number of 
government interests.172  Indeed, Bopp and Coleson contended that “a 
state’s interest in protecting the interests of fathers in their unborn 
children rise[s] to the level of being compelling.”173  As Bopp and 
Coleson framed it, abortion was not a fundamental right for women; 
women had a right to override fathers’ decisions only if they had 
compelling enough reasons to do so.174  The lawyers’ petition for writ 
of certiorari mentioned the following example:  if because of 
reproductive capacity, a man stood to lose his last chance of having a 
genetic child, a woman should lose out if she had “relatively weaker 
reasons” for choosing abortion, such as wanting a boy rather than a 
girl.175  An individualized balancing analysis meant that women had to 
                                               
 167. See id. (asserting that “[c]ourts are ill-equipped to evaluate” all the factors 
involved in the abortion decision). 
 168. Id. at 8. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 145, at 7–17 (arguing the state 
has a compelling interest in protecting a man’s interest in his unborn child). 
 172. See id. at 7–10 (contending the right to abortion is not absolute and Danforth 
did not preclude states from balancing paternal rights). 
 173. Id. at 10. 
 174. See id. at 6–12. 
 175. Id. at 14. 
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deserve their abortion rights.176  Women who acted for the wrong 
reasons would have few rights at all.177 
Bopp and Coleson’s analysis of Smith’s case offered additional 
insight into how a balancing test would apply.  Bopp and Coleson 
emphasized the intensity of a father’s interest in parenthood and 
willingness to accept custody and complete financial responsibility for 
having a child.178  The petition for writ of certiorari also described Jane 
Doe’s reasons for choosing abortion as frivolous, such as an interest in 
keeping herself free from responsibilities that would compromise her 
ability to find a future romantic partner.179 
The Supreme Court declined to take the case,180 but it was just the 
first of many in the late 1980s that pro-lifers would bring using a 
balancing test to erode women’s abortion rights.181  Abortion-rights 
attorneys responded by arguing that cases like Danforth had settled the 
matter.182  But despite any similarities between Danforth and the more 
recent cases, those on both sides recognized that the make-up of the 
Court had changed, and the outcome could be quite different with 
President Reagan nominees on the bench.183 
While Bopp and Coleson saw a balancing approach as an opening to 
attack legal abortion immediately, the Court was not yet ready to 
overrule Roe.  In 1986, the Supreme Court issued its most recent 
abortion decision, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists.184  In Thornburgh, the Court struck down each part of a 
challenged Pennsylvania statute and rebuked those who did not accept 
that Roe was the law.185  However, four justices dissented, including 
Chief Justice Warren Burger, one of the justices who had voted with 
                                               
 176. See id. at 5–14. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. at 14–16. 
 179. See id. at 15–17. 
 180. See Smith v. Doe, 492 U.S. 919 (1988) (denying certiorari). 
 181. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 182. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 152, at 6–8. 
 183. For a discussion on pro-lifers’ hopes that Anthony Kennedy, the most recent 
Supreme Court nominee at the time, would be the fifth vote to overrule Roe, see Dave 
Andrusko, Pro-abortionists Unsure Whether to Appeal Decision Upholding Parent Notification 
Law, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Aug. 28, 1988, at 5. 
 184. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 185. See id. at 758–71 (emphasizing that “the constitutional principles that led this 
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constitutional dimensions of a woman’s right to decide whether to end her 
pregnancy”). 
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the majority in Roe.186  Several of the dissenters explicitly called for the 
reexamination of Roe.187  
The 1987 retirement of Lewis Powell made the overruling of Roe 
more likely.188  Ronald Reagan quickly nominated Robert Bork, a judge 
on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, to replace Powell.189  Bork’s nomination became one of the most 
polarizing nominations in American history.190  A group of disparate, 
left-leaning organizations formed the Block Bork Coalition to doom the 
judge’s nomination.191  Bork had been an outspoken critic of Roe and 
other substantive due process decisions, and had suggested that they 
represented particularly egregious examples of judicial activism.192 
                                               
 186. See id. at 782–85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 785–14 (White, J., dissenting); 
id. at 814–25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissents of 
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(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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THE NEW POLITICS OF SENATE CONFIRMATION 56 (2002) (discussing how Bork was 
considered “extremely conservative” but generally respected by members of the 
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247 (2008) (examining the public’s reception to the news that President Reagan’s 
intended to nominate Bork). 
 190. See, e.g., JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES vii 
(1995) (noting that over 300 liberal interest groups expressly protested Bork’s 
nomination, while over 100 conservative interest groups supported his nomination); 
SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY:  ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT, 1776–2011 392 (6th ed. 2012) (characterizing Bork’s nomination as 
“without parallel in the history of judicial nominations”); STEPHEN W. STATHIS, 
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WAR IN IRAQ 445 (2009) (describing the “intense political battle” surrounding Bork’s 
nomination and the “unprecedented role” that the media played in his confirmation). 
 191. See LANNY DAVIS, SCANDAL:  HOW “GOTCHA” POLITICS IS DESTROYING AMERICA 110 
(2006) (illustrating the Coalition’s grassroots methodology for attacking Bork’s 
nomination); Neal Devins, Substantive Due Process, Public Opinion, and the “Right” to Die, in 
THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 327, 335 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006) (outlining the Coalition’s 
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 192. See, e.g., MARK GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION:  EQUAL CHOICE, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS 24–25 (1996). 
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In early October, Bork’s bid for the Court failed in committee.193  
Although many expected the nominee to concede defeat, both Bork and 
President Reagan called for a full Senate debate.194  Given that Democrats 
controlled the Senate, the outcome of the final vote did not come as a 
surprise:  Bork’s nomination failed by a vote of 42–58.195  Bork’s hearings 
started a new era of Supreme Court nominations; one marked by 
increasing partisanship and high-stakes interest group spending.196 
Reagan’s next nominee, Anthony Kennedy, a judge from the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, had no trouble in 
Congress.197  By February 1988, the Senate voted unanimously to 
confirm him.198  NRLC leaders obviously saw Kennedy, and other 
Supreme Court nominees, as the linchpin of a bolder attack on Roe.199  
“Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has described Roe v. Wade as being on a 
collision course with itself,” wrote NRLC President John Willke.200  
“Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy have not yet voted 
directly on a law restricting abortion, . . . but [i]t is hoped that all three 
will vote to overrule Roe v. Wade if and when the time comes.”201  As 
important to their attack on Roe, George H.W. Bush, Reagan’s vice 
                                               
 193. See Edward Walsh & Al Kamen, Senate Panel Votes 9–5 to Reject Bork, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 7, 1987), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/10/07/ 
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 198. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
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president, won the 1988 election and pledged to continue nominating 
judges like Bork.202 
The stakes of a balancing approach became clearer when Bopp and 
Coleson took the case of Erin Andrew Conn.203  Conn and his wife, 
Jennifer, had a five-month old daughter, Crystal, but their marriage 
was failing.204  Nineteen-year-old Jennifer, who had scheduled an 
abortion to end her six-week pregnancy, told Erin that she was filing 
for divorce.205  Bopp and Coleson brought suit, as they had in similar 
fathers’ rights cases, to ask for an injunction to stop Jennifer from 
ending her pregnancy.206 
In Conn v. Conn,207 Bopp and Coleson offered more insight into what 
a balancing test would require.  The two suggested that such a test was 
appropriate in the abortion context because both genetic mothers and 
fathers had constitutional interests at stake in the dispute.208  
Nonetheless, the two favored a balancing test because it suggested that 
whatever interest women had in abortion, it was not a fundamental 
right.209  “[T]his Court has demonstrated that a compelling interest is 
not always necessary when rights and interests of the parties are at 
stake,” Bopp and Coleson wrote.210  The two pointed to the Supreme 
Court’s adoption of balancing in parental-involvement cases as 
evidence that abortion was not a right in any traditional sense.211  The 
Court had created “a scheme grounded in individual judicial 
determination on a case by case basis of whether a minor’s abortion 
                                               
 202. For a discussion on Bush’s promises regarding the Court, see JAN CRAWFORD 
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should be authorized or precluded.”212  Bopp and Coleson believed 
that by adopting a balancing test, the trial court signaled its willingness 
to retreat from protecting abortion rights.213 
The Supreme Court declined to hear Conn, but the push for men’s 
rights in abortion continued.214  In 1989, the Supreme Court decided 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.215  In Webster, the Court upheld a 
Missouri anti-abortion law, and a plurality of the Justices suggested that 
Roe’s trimester framework was no longer tenable.216  In the aftermath, 
pro-lifers looked for a vehicle for ending legal abortion, and balancing 
approaches took a back seat to more aggressive alternatives.217  NRLC 
promoted a model law which claimed to ban abortion as a form of 
“birth control”; the law allowed abortions only in cases of rape, incest, 
or a threat to a woman’s life or health.218   
In 1992, the Court again weighed men’s rights in Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.219  Casey involved a multi-part 
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N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/16/us/guam-
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Bill, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 1990, at D5. 
 219. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Pennsylvania law that included a spousal-notification requirement.220  
Pennsylvania made it illegal for a doctor to perform an abortion 
without first receiving a signed written statement from a woman that 
she had notified her husband about the abortion.221  A woman further 
had the option of furnishing an alternative written statement, indicating: 
that her husband is not the man who impregnated her; that her 
husband could not be located; that the pregnancy is the result of 
spousal sexual assault which she has reported; or that the woman 
believes that notifying her husband will cause him or someone else 
to inflict bodily injury upon her.222 
The Casey Court famously refused to overrule Roe.223  The Court did, 
however, upend the doctrinal framework that applied to abortion 
law.224  Casey reasoned that because the government’s interest in 
protecting fetal life applied throughout pregnancy, Roe’s trimester 
framework was fatally flawed.225  As an alternative, the Court adopted 
the undue burden standard, which asks whether a law has the purpose 
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion.226 
In Casey, the Court applied the undue burden test and struck down 
Pennsylvania’s spousal-notification law.227  Canvassing scholarly 
research and studying the trial court’s findings of fact, the Court 
reasoned that most women who refused to tell their husbands did so 
for valid reasons, including the threat of domestic violence.228  
Furthermore, the Court did not think that the exceptions written into 
the Pennsylvania statute made a difference.229  As the Court saw it, 
domestic violence victims would often be deterred from seeking an 
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544 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:515 
 
abortion by the notification requirement.230  In cases of sexual assault, 
the exception seemed especially useless:  many victims of sexual assault 
would fail to meet reporting requirements, especially if their husbands 
were notified that an investigation was taking place.231  “Section 3209 
embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common-law status of 
married women but repugnant to our present understanding of 
marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution,” 
the Court explained.232  “Women do not lose their constitutionally 
protected liberty when they marry.”233 
The Court’s rejection of the spousal-notification law was especially 
striking given the Justices’ willingness to uphold every other part of the 
disputed law.234  For example, the Court upheld the statute’s medical 
emergency provision, which did not allow for abortion for certain 
serious health conditions, including “eclampsia, inevitable abortion, 
and premature ruptured membrane.”235  Casey certainly did not close 
the door on new abortion restrictions,236 but it seemed unwise for 
abortion foes to focus on men’s rights or the kind of balancing 
approach that Bopp and Coleson had used. 
Just the same, the use of balancing tests in the abortion context tell 
a cautionary tale.  Bopp and Coleson gravitated toward a balancing test 
because they believed that such an approach implied that women did 
not have a fundamental abortion right.237  Similarly, in cases involving 
ART, where important constitutional interests are likely in play, a 
balancing approach seems to be in tension with the possible future 
recognition of any procreative right.  As Bopp and Coleson recognized, 
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balancing analyses implied that a number of interests could outweigh 
whatever liberty women have.238 
Courts are still grappling with how the Constitution applies in 
assisted-reproduction cases.  Case law on the subject sends 
contradictory messages about whether there is a fundamental right to 
seek or avoid procreation.239  By focusing so much on the facts of 
individual cases, courts have not consistently explained the nature of 
either right or the relationship between them.240  Because of these 
unpredictable results, it is difficult for parties using ART to know ahead 
of time how an embryo-disposition suit will end.  By finding that other 
interests outweigh an interest in seeking or avoiding procreation, 
courts can also suggest that there is no right to seek or avoid genetic 
parenthood.  Judges should not weigh in on these crucial constitutional 
questions without more careful consideration and briefing of the issues. 
As important, Bopp and Coleson preferred a balancing test because 
it encouraged judges to zero in on individual’s reasons for seeking or 
avoiding parenthood.  By sifting through the most intimate details of 
people’s lives, judges would certainly reach unpredictable results, and 
the door might remain open for decisions forcing a woman to carry a 
pregnancy to term.  The same invasiveness and prejudice can easily 
characterize balancing in the context of ART. 
B.    Whole Woman’s Health and Balancing 
More than two decades after Casey, a balancing approach was once 
again at the center of abortion law.  In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court 
also addressed what Casey’s undue burden standard required.241  The 
Court ultimately answered this question by laying out a balancing 
analysis required by the undue burden test.242  This Article next 
examines how Whole Woman’s Health adopted such an approach, how 
the lower courts have applied it, and what the uses of balancing reveal 
                                               
 238. See supra notes 209–213 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2–3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) 
(explaining that, as with abortion, ART does not provide fathers with additional rights 
to compel or avoid procreation), rev’d, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), aff’d, 
696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).  But see Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) 
(stating that “a right to procreational autonomy is inherent in our most basic concepts 
of liberty” and is made up of two equal parts—“the right to procreate and the right to 
avoid procreation”). 
 240. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 241. See 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016) (articulating that Casey requires courts to balance 
“the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer”). 
 242. See id. 
546 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:515 
 
about its limitations.  Whole Woman’s Health concerned two parts of 
Texas’s H.B. 2 (HB2).243  One provision required abortion doctors to 
have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles.244  The 
second provision mandated that abortion clinics comply with state 
regulations governing ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs) even if a 
clinic relied on medication abortion.245 
The impact of HB2 seemed likely to be profound.  Most providers 
did not have, and likely could not get, admitting privileges because, 
among other reasons, not enough women went to the hospital after an 
abortion to meet threshold admitting requirements.246  For many 
clinics, the ASC requirements, especially those demanding the 
overhaul of clinic facilities, would be prohibitively expensive.247  Data 
suggested that it would cost clinics $1 million to comply with the ASC 
regulations; it would be three times more to build a new facility.248 
Abortion providers first challenged only the admitting privileges 
law.249  While the district court held that the requirement created an 
undue burden, the Fifth Circuit reversed.250  Shortly after, abortion 
providers returned to court, this time challenging the ASC regulation 
and arguing that the admitting privileges mandate was 
unconstitutional as applied to clinics in McAllen and El Paso.251  The 
district court again sided with Whole Woman’s Health,252 and the Fifth 
Circuit reversed a second time.253  In part, the Fifth Circuit relied on 
the doctrine of res judicata, emphasizing that providers could have 
raised the same challenges during their original lawsuit.254  The court 
further offered its perspective on what the undue burden standard 
                                               
 243. Id. at 2300. 
 244. See id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (West 2013)). 
 245. See id. (citing § 245.010(a)). 
 246. See id. at 2312. 
 247. Id. at 2314–16 (explaining that the surgical center requirements would reduce 
the number of abortion facilities in Texas to only seven or eight). 
 248. Brief for Petitioners at 6–7, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, (U.S.) (No. 15-
274), 2015 WL 9592289. 
 249. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing Planned Parenthood of Greater 
Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901 (W.D. Tex. 2013)). 
 250. Id. at 2300–01 (citing Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health 
Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 592 (5th Cir. 2014)). 
 251. Id. at 2301; see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 678 
(W.D. Tex. 2014). 
 252. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2303 (citing to Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 687). 
 253. Id. (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(per curiam)). 
 254. See id. (explaining the Fifth Circuit’s rationale for reversing the district court). 
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required.255  The court first applied a rational basis test, then asked 
whether the law unduly burdened a woman’s abortion decision.256 
When the Supreme Court took the case, those on both sides 
disputed what the undue burden standard required.257  Representing 
Whole Woman’s Health, the Center for Reproductive Rights (the 
Center) insisted that “[t]he undue burden standard strikes a careful 
balance between a woman’s liberty to make decisions about 
childbearing . . . with ‘the State’s profound interest in potential 
life.’”258  The Center argued that the courts had to weigh “the severity 
of the obstacle relative to the strength of the state’s interest in 
imposing it.”259  To determine the purpose of the law, as the Center 
saw it, the Court should not blindly accept legislators’ account of what 
they were doing.260  Instead, the Court would have to evaluate whether 
a law reasonably advanced its stated end.261 
The Center argued that the decrease in abortion access would have 
an impermissible effect, “increasing the wait time for appointments at 
abortion facilities and the distances that many women would have to 
travel to reach those facilities.”262  Insisting that these effects had to be 
weighed against the health benefits (or lack thereof) created by the Texas 
law, the Center argued that HB2 unduly burdened women’s rights.263 
Texas read the undue burden standard quite differently.264  Rather 
than evaluating the strength of the government’s purpose, the Court, 
                                               
 255. See id. (noting the Fifth Circuit’s undue burden standard found a statute 
constitutional if “(1) it does not have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus; and (2) it is 
reasonably related to (or designed to further) a legitimate state interest” (quoting Cole, 
790 F.3d at 572)). 
 256. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 293 (5th Cir. 2014) (staying 
the district court’s second injunction against the two HB2 provisions at issue). 
 257. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 248, at 2 (“Under no circumstances . . . may 
a state enact ‘[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of 
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.” (quoting Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992))); Brief for Respondents at 
15, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (U.S.) (No. 15-274), 2016 WL 344496 (“The 
undue burden test analyzes the degree of an abortion law’s burden to determine 
whether it imposes a substantial obstacle to abortion access; it does not reweigh the 
medical justifications for a law by balancing them against the law’s burdens”). 
 258. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 248, at 44 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878). 
 259. Id. at 45. 
 260. See id. at 47. 
 261. See id. 
 262. Id. at 49. 
 263. See id. 
 264. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 257, at 20. 
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as Texas saw it, should recognize that “[c]onstitutional analysis of a 
statute’s purpose is highly deferential.”265  The fact that lawmakers 
knew or should know that HB2 would close clinics did not change the 
analysis.266  “In any industry, businesses that do not meet governing 
regulations may not be able to operate, and a legislature may be well 
aware of that fact,” Texas reasoned.267  “But that does not prove a 
legislative purpose to produce whatever effects may flow from closing 
a business, rather than to achieve the public-welfare benefits of the 
regulations.”268  Furthermore, Texas argued that the law would have 
little effect, as most women would still live near metropolitan areas with 
an abortion clinic.269 
In June 2016, a short-handed Court handed down a five-to-three 
decision adopting a balancing analysis similar to the one the Center 
proposed.270  After holding that res judicata did not bar the petitioners’ 
challenge, the Court turned to the meaning of the undue burden 
standard.271  The Court first clarified that Casey required “that courts 
consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with 
the benefits those laws confer.”272  How would this analysis work?  The 
Court offered little guidance but referred to two provisions analyzed 
by Casey:  the parental-notification law upheld in that case and the 
spousal-notification measure struck down by the Court.273  In both of 
these cases, as the Court in Whole Woman’s Health explained, the Court 
performed a “balancing.”274 
The Court further clarified what kind of evidence would factor into 
the balance Casey commanded.275  Texas argued that under the Court’s 
earlier decisions, lower courts should defer to lawmakers’ assessments 
of contested scientific evidence.276  Thus, although the Court should 
                                               
 265. Id. at 31. 
 266. See id. at 42. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See id. at 45. 
 270. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016) 
(concluding that the district court applied the correct standard while the Fifth Circuit 
did not).  Whole Woman’s Health was argued and decided after the death of Justice Scalia. 
 271. Id. at 2309. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See id. at 2310. 
 276. See id. at 2309–10 (rejecting the undue standard applied by the Court of 
Appeals that relied on Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), which upheld the 
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defer to Texas legislators’ conclusion that HB2 would protect women’s 
health,277 it rejected this argument.278  Instead, it held that courts 
performing a balancing test should place the most “weight upon 
evidence and argument presented in judicial proceedings.”279 
The Court’s application of the balancing test offered additional 
guidance.280  The Court stressed that the record contained no evidence 
that the admitting privileges provision solved a problem.281  The Court 
in Whole Woman’s Health reasoned that the complication rate for 
abortion was low, that even fewer complications resulted in 
hospitalization, and that more serious complications did not become 
apparent at the clinic when admitting privileges would come into 
play.282  The Court further measured the benefit achieved by the 
admitting privilege law as compared to the measures that were 
previously in place.283  The Court in Whole Woman’s Health performed a 
similar analysis of the ASC provision.284 
The Court weighed the burdens created by the admitting privilege 
and ASC provisions of HB2 against their lack of achieved benefits.285  
The Court in Whole Woman’s Health reasoned that there was enough 
evidence supporting the district court’s conclusion that the facilities 
that could comply with HB2 could not meet the demand created by 
                                               
federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act); Brief for Respondents, supra note 257, at 16 
(“As Gonzales held, where the medical evidence is in dispute, legislatures have ‘wide 
discretion’ to enact medical regulations . . . .  Gonzales does not permit a district court 
to choose one version of the disputed medical evidence, under the guise of making 
witness-credibility determinations, and use that disputed view to find abortion laws 
unconstitutional.” (citations omitted)). 
 277. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310; Brief for Respondents, supra note 
257, at 26 (arguing that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly applied Gonzales 
by deferring to legislative judgment). 
 278. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 (“[I]n Gonzales the Court, while 
pointing out that we must review legislative ‘fact-finding under a deferential standard,’ 
added that we must not ‘place dispositive weight’ on those ‘findings.’” (quoting 
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165)). 
 279. Id. 
 280. See generally id. at 2310–18 (applying the balancing test to the challenged 
provisions of the Texas statute). 
 281. See id. at 2311 (finding that, although the provision was enacted to ensure “easy 
access to a hospital” in the event of complications during an abortion procedure, 
“nothing in Texas’ record evidence . . . shows that . . . the new law advanced Texas’s 
legitimate interest in protecting women’s health”). 
 282. See id. (discussing the evidence and expert testimony in the record). 
 283. Id. at 2311–12. 
 284. Id. at 2314–18. 
 285. Id. at 2310–18. 
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the number of clinics HB2 would force to close.286  The Court further 
reasoned that given the lack of benefit delivered by the law, other 
burdens were also constitutionally cognizable.287  The Court noted that 
if HB2 went into effect, women would be “less likely to get the kind of 
individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support 
that doctors at less taxed facilities may have offered.”288 
At first, Whole Woman’s Health may seem to cast balancing approaches 
in a positive light.  After all, the Court used a balancing analysis to put 
real teeth in the undue burden standard and strengthen protections 
for abortion rights.289  In the context of ART, it seems possible to use a 
balancing analysis to protect emerging constitutional interests in 
seeking or avoiding parenthood.  Whole Woman’s Health also appears to 
offer solid guidance about how balancing should proceed.   
However, the lower courts’ application of Whole Woman’s Health 
should create concern for those who hope to use a balancing test to 
sort out the competing interests at stake in embryo-disposition cases.  
This Section next explores these efforts to apply Whole Woman’s Health. 
C.   Knowing What to Balance:   
The Aftermath of Whole Woman’s Health 
Since the Court decided Whole Woman’s Health, lower courts have 
grappled with exactly how the Court’s balancing analysis fits in existing 
abortion jurisprudence.  The case law created in the aftermath of Whole 
Woman’s Health should give us pause.   
For example, several courts have dealt with laws similar to HB2’s 
admitting privileges requirement.290  Some of these cases address laws 
virtually identical to HB2 that required admitting privileges at a 
hospital within thirty miles of a clinic.291  Others vary slightly, such as 
                                               
 286. Id. at 2316–18. 
 287. Id. at 2318. 
 288. Id.  
 289. See id. at 2310. 
 290. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953, 955–56 
(8th Cir. 2017); Hopkins v. Jegley, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1033–34 (E.D. Ark. 2017), 
appeal filed, No. 17-2879 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, 2017); June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250 
F. Supp. 3d 27, 33 (M.D. La. 2017), rev’d by June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, No. 17-
30397, 2018 WL 4611031 (5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2018). 
 291. See, e.g., Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 53–54 (“Act 620 provides that every 
physician who performs or induces an abortion shall ‘have active admitting privileges 
at a hospital that is located no further than thirty miles from the location at which the 
abortion is performed or induced . . . .’” (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 1061.10(A)(2)(a) 
(2016), formerly LA. REV. STAT. § 40.1299.35.2A(1) (2014))). 
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Arkansas’s requirement that abortion providers contract with a 
physician or hospital that can deal with any ensuing complications.292 
The results in these cases showcase the difficulty of understanding—
and applying—a balancing analysis consistently when the facts (and 
courts’ views of the constitutional stakes) vary.  Consider the clashing 
results reached by the district court and the Eighth Circuit when 
evaluating the Arkansas Abortion-Inducing Drug Safety Act.293  This 
law requires any physician dispensing medical abortion to have a 
contract with a physician dedicated to handling emergencies.294  That 
physician, in turn, must have “active admitting, gynecological/surgical 
privileges at a hospital designated to handle any emergencies 
associated with . . . an abortion-inducing drug.”295 
Relying on Whole Woman’s Health, Planned Parenthood of Arkansas 
and Eastern Oklahoma challenged the constitutionality of the law.296  
In applying Whole Woman’s Health’s balancing test, the district court 
first considered whether the law added any benefit when compared to 
the protocols that Planned Parenthood already had in place.297  
Arkansas claimed that the law guaranteed continuity of care for 
women, thereby improving health outcomes.298  In evaluating this 
argument, the district court focused on the language of the statute, 
noting that Arkansas did not require the physician addressing 
complications to have a prior relationship with a patient, accompany 
her to the hospital, or otherwise guarantee continuity of care.299 
The court also reasoned that the law did not guarantee more 
continuity of care than did Planned Parenthood’s protocols.300  
                                               
 292. See, e.g., Jegley, 864 F.3d at 955–56 (examining the constitutionality of 
Arkansas’s Abortion-Inducing Drugs Safety Act, which requires that the “physician who 
gives, sells, dispenses, administers, or otherwise provides or prescribes the abortion-
inducing drug shall have a signed contract with a physician who agrees to handle 
complications” (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1504(d)(1) (2014))). 
 293. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-1501–1510.  Compare Jegley, 864 F.3d at 958–60 
(prioritizing safety concerns over potential burdens), with Planned Parenthood of Ark. 
& E. Okla. V. Jegley, No. 4:15-cv-00784-KGB, 2016 WL 6211310, at *29–32 (E.D. Ark. 
Mar. 14, 2016) (finding that the burdens outweighed the benefits given the existing 
protections in place). 
 294. See § 20-16-1504(d)(1). 
 295. § 20-16-1504(d)(2). 
 296. See Jegley, 2016 WL 6211310, at *12–13. 
 297. See id. at *18, *20, *25 (analyzing the benefits of the contracted physician and 
final printed label requirements of the Arkansas law). 
 298. Id. at *15. 
 299. See id. at *16. 
 300. See id. 
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Because abortion was relatively safe, women rarely reported 
complications; and, Planned Parenthood instructed patients to call 
Planned Parenthood’s twenty-four-hour helpline.301  When the 
circumstances demanded it, Planned Parenthood also referred 
patients to emergency facilities, communicated with hospital staff, and 
arranged for follow-up care.302  Because Planned Parenthood took 
extensive precautions to address complications, and because there did 
not seem to be any problem in the first place, the court found that the 
Arkansas statute was a “solution in search of a problem.”303 
When it came to the effect of the law, the court observed that 
Planned Parenthood had not been able to contract with a physician 
and would be unable to do so in the future.304  If the contracted 
physician provision went into effect, as the court explained, only one 
clinic would continue providing abortions in the state and all of them 
which would be surgical.305  As the court saw it, the burdens of 
Arkansas’s law outweighed the benefits.306 
However, the Eighth Circuit reversed, seeing Whole Woman’s Health’s 
balancing analysis quite differently.307  The court’s analysis turned on 
the meaning of Casey’s large-fraction test, under which the plaintiff can 
prevail by demonstrating that “in a large fraction of the cases in which 
[the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a 
woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.”308  The Court in Whole Woman’s 
Health clarified that the large-fraction test applied to women “for whom 
[the provision] is an actual rather than irrelevant restriction.”309 
The district court had zeroed in on women affected by the law,310 but 
as the Eighth Circuit saw it, the district court abused its discretion by 
failing to estimate a specific number of women who would be burdened 
                                               
 301. See id. at *17. 
 302. See id. 
 303. Id. at *18. 
 304. See id. at *29. 
 305. See id. at *30. 
 306. See id. at *30–31. 
 307. See Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953, 958–60 (8th 
Cir. 2017). 
 308. Id. at 958 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)). 
 309. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016). 
 310. See Jegley, 2016 WL 6211310, at *4, *7–8 (finding evidence that the 
requirements would increase travel and costs for women, which could force them to 
seek abortions later and would therefore require riskier surgical abortions rather than 
medication abortions). 
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by the Arkansas law.311  Although insisting that the district court did not 
need to calculate the exact number of women who would have to 
postpone or forego abortions, the court demanded more specificity.312 
The Eighth Circuit also suggested that Planned Parenthood needed 
to do more to show that existing facilities could not expand to meet 
increased patient demand.313  The court further questioned whether even 
under Whole Woman’s Health, increased wait times, crowding, and lower 
quality of care would count as a burden in the first place.314  Whereas the 
lack of a health benefit was decisive in Whole Woman’s Health, the benefit, 
or lack thereof, played no part in the Eighth Circuit’s analysis.315 
The Eighth Circuit’s approach stood in tension with that of other 
courts considering admitting privilege statutes.  Consider June Medical 
Services LLC v. Kliebert,316 a Louisiana case involving another law similar 
to HB2.317  Louisiana “Act 620” mandates that abortion performing 
physicians have “active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located 
not further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is 
performed . . . and that provides obstetrical or gynecological health 
care services.”318  The district court enjoined enforcement of the law, 
stressing that Louisiana lacked any evidence demonstrating that 
abortion clinics improperly treated abortion or that admitting 
privileges would prevent any negative outcomes.319  The court 
estimated that 10,000 women sought abortions in Louisiana.320  If the 
                                               
 311. See Jegley, 864 F.3d at 958–60 (acknowledging that the district court correctly 
narrowed the affected population to “women seeking medication abortions in Arkansas” 
but had abused its discretion in failing to determine how many woman who would face 
“increased travel distances,” “would forgo abortions,” or “postpone their abortions”). 
 312. See id. at 960. 
 313. See id. at 959 (noting that the record did not provide evidence that the 
remaining facilities would be unable to “absorb” a higher demand for services if 
Planned Parenthood had to close). 
 314. See id. (suggesting that, since the Supreme Court relied on Gonzales in the 
Hellerstedt ruling, state and federal legislatures still had “wide discretion to pass 
legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty” (quoting 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007))). 
 315. See id. at 960 (remanding on the grounds that the district court record noted 
“no concrete . . . findings” that a large fraction of women would be unduly burdened 
by the Arkansas requirements). 
 316. 250 F. Supp. 3d. 27 (M.D. La. 2017), rev’d by June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 
905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 317. See Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 53–54 (analyzing the constitutionality of 
Louisiana’s Unsafe Abortion Protection Act, LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1601.10 (2014)). 
 318. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1601.10(A)(2)(a). 
 319. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 86–87. 
 320. See id. at 87. 
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law went into effect, only one provider would remain.321  The court 
concluded that there was no way for this doctor, who currently 
performed fewer than 3000 abortions a year, to meet the demand that 
would be created by the law.322  Based on these findings, the court 
reasoned that the number of self-induced abortions would increase 
and women would face delays, increased travel distances, and a lower 
quality of care.323  The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court in June 
Medical Services L.L.C. v. Gee,324 insisting that the Louisiana law differed 
from the one in Whole Woman’s Health.325  Because the law would result 
in fewer clinic closures and because the Fifth Circuit found evidence 
that Louisiana’s law would benefit women, the court distinguished it 
from Whole Woman’s Health.326  
It is possible to distinguish the laws analyzed in these cases:  for 
example, the Arkansas law did not specify a distance to a hospital at 
which a doctor had admitting privileges.327  In theory, the Supreme 
Court could resolve any ambiguities in how the Whole Woman’s Health 
balancing approach should apply.  The Court could explain how 
precise a lower court needs to be in its estimate of the number of 
women affected by a law or how important it is that a law does not seem 
to address a grave problem. 
Without such guidance, the Court’s balancing approach invites the 
kind of inconsistency that now characterizes the lower courts’ 
decisions.  In Whole Woman’s Health, the court took an approach that is 
inherently open-ended and fact-intensive.  Under such an approach, 
lower courts are able to uphold laws that look almost exactly the same 
as the one struck down in Whole Woman’s Health by simply 
distinguishing the facts of the case.  The Eighth Circuit suggested that 
Arkansas’s contracted-physician requirement might impact a relatively 
smaller number of women than HB2.328  The court further suggested 
                                               
 321. See id. 
 322. See id. 
 323. See id. at 66, 89. 
 324. 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 325. Id. at 815. 
 326. Id. at 811. 
 327. Compare Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 31–36, 47 (finding a statute that requires 
hospital admitting privileges by physicians performing abortions to be an undue 
burden on women), with Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, 864 F.3d 
953, 957–58 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding that a statute requiring hospital 
admitting privileges to be constitutional since plaintiffs failed to prove a large fraction 
of women seeking abortions were burdened). 
 328. See Jegley, 864 F.3d at 957–59. 
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that the burdens stressed in HB2—including increased travel distances, 
waiting times, or a lower quality of care—mattered because of the facts 
of that case rather than because of any generalizable principle.329 
Moreover, courts have reacted differently to Whole Woman’s Health’s 
conclusion that abortion is safe and that admitting privilege 
requirements do not address a real problem.330  For some courts, a law 
delivering no benefit cannot justifiably benefit women even if the 
burdens remain hard to quantify precisely.331  For the Eighth Circuit, 
by contrast, the burden is paramount.332  Even if the Arkansas 
Abortion-Inducing Drug Safety Act did almost nothing for women, it 
would be constitutional so long as it did not burden a sufficiently large 
number of women.333 
The aftermath of Whole Woman’s Health highlights additional 
problems with a balancing approach.  When it comes to politically-
charged issues like embryo disposition or abortion, courts will almost 
inevitably view the facts differently.  Balancing approaches invite 
discordant results.  In the abortion context, for example, courts can 
disagree about the degree of the benefit or burden created by a law 
and the relative importance of the advantages and disadvantages of a 
law.  Courts can also reach conflicting results when the evidence is—
or is claimed to be—contested, resolving medical or factually uncertain 
questions in disparate ways.  Something similar can easily take place in 
the ART context.  Courts can disagree about the relative importance 
of competing interests in seeking and avoiding procreation and the 
hierarchy of procreative rights.  When there are medical questions 
about the prospects of future fertility or ideological questions about 
the comparability of adoption, courts can also reach strikingly 
different outcomes. 
In the ART context, this uncertainty is especially disturbing.  As the 
Supreme Court recognized in Casey, women have ordered their lives 
                                               
 329. See id. 
 330. Compare Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 48–50 (requiring admitting privileges 
provided no benefit that would outweigh the burden on women seeking abortion), with 
Jegley, 864 F.3d at 960 (holding that requiring admitting privileges was constitutional 
because the benefit to the safety of women outweighed the potential burden). 
 331. See, e.g., Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 88–89 (“Any marginal health benefits would 
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around the availability of legal abortion.334  The legal uncertainty that 
is so obvious in the aftermath of Whole Woman’s Health makes it harder 
for women to know when and if abortion will be available.  Inconsistent 
results can have an even greater chilling effect.  Couples using ART 
undergo a time-consuming procedure like IVF to procreate, and often 
they complete extensive paperwork addressing their options after 
embryos are created.335  With an uncertain balancing test in place, 
those using ART have no way of knowing ex ante how a court will view 
the soundness of the documents governing embryo disposition or the 
facts of a particular case.  While ART holds out the possibility of well-
planned, deliberate reproduction, balancing approaches show that any 
such promise is hollow. 
By looking at the history evaluated here, Part III closely examines 
the problems with leading approaches to embryo-disposition disputes.  
Part III then proposes a solution that should lead to more predictable, 
fair, and constitutionally sound outcomes in embryo-disposition suits. 
III.    BEYOND BALANCING 
Most courts addressing embryo-disposition cases conclude that it 
would be better if the parties reached their own decision about what 
to do.  For this reason, the majority of courts that follow the court’s 
approach in Kass and look for an appropriate contract to resolve 
embryo-disposition suits.336  Even the mutual, contemporaneous 
agreement strategy adopted in Witten demands an agreement on the 
part of those contesting embryo disposition.337  In practice, however, 
an adequate contract is hard to come by.  Most of those who use IVF, 
like Vergara and Loeb, at most, sign forms that address disputes 
                                               
 334. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853–57 (1992) 
(“[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized 
intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their 
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that 
contraception should fail.”). 
 335. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 5, at 61–89 (detailing the situation for many fertility 
patients of facing a “thick packet” of consent forms before beginning treatment). 
 336. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 174 (N.Y. 1998) (applying a balancing 
approach if no valid disposition contract can be found). 
 337. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781–82 (Iowa 2003) (holding 
that state enforcement of a prior agreement after one of the parties changed their 
mind about their reproductive choice was against public policy). 
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between patients and fertility clinics.338  Some have no written 
agreement at all.339  Lacking a convincing agreement, courts often fall 
back on a balancing analysis.340 
The history of balancing in the abortion context illuminates some of 
the problems that will arise if courts continue to follow a similar 
approach in embryo-disposition suits.  First, a balancing analysis makes 
it harder for courts to get right the tricky constitutional questions that 
will inevitably come up in embryo-disposition suits.  Judges applying 
balancing tests could send the message that the right to abortion is not 
truly fundamental.341  By siding with a father, courts would send the 
message that many men have personal circumstances that could 
outweigh any liberty interest in abortion that the Constitution 
recognizes.342  As important, a balancing test tends to generate quite 
different results in different jurisdictions, sending conflicting messages 
about the relative strengths of someone’s interest in seeking or 
avoiding procreation.343 
ART has started a series of crucially important debates about the 
relationship between constitutional law and reproduction.344  The 
Supreme Court’s case law on abortion and contraception suggests that 
the Constitution recognizes rights to seek and avoid procreation,345 but 
related constitutional questions have no clear answer.  Does the 
Constitution just recognize a right to terminate a pregnancy or use 
contraception?  Is there a broader right to seek parenthood?  What 
kind of parenthood:  functional, gestational, or genetic?  Does a right 
to seek parenthood outweigh the right to avoid parenthood? 
                                               
 338. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 5, at 83, 86 (“[C]linics provide the forms and their 
primary purpose is to provide written documentation of the patients’ informed 
consent and thereby protect the physician from liability.”). 
 339. See id. at 61. 
 340. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text (detailing why many courts 
continue to use the balancing analysis in fertility cases, despite ongoing criticisms). 
 341. See supra notes 132–133 and accompanying text (explaining that some scholars 
support the use of the balancing test since it implies that women do not have a 
fundamental abortion right). 
 342. See supra notes 142–157 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra notes 291–297 and accompanying text. 
 344. See Ziegler, supra note 36, at 1263–70. 
 345. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–11 (2016); 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870–77 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55 (1972); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
558 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:515 
 
These are significant questions, and balancing approaches send a 
puzzling message about these constitutional issues.  Courts have 
reached conflicting results in these cases.  In some instances, courts 
have held that one party’s interest in avoiding parenthood outweighs 
another’s desire to seek parenthood.346  Others have sided with the 
party seeking parenthood if the use of embryos represents someone’s 
last procreative chance.347  The constitutional dimensions of embryo-
disposition questions remain obscure.  State courts have just begun to 
illuminate the boundaries and relative strength of these rights, and 
federal courts have barely weighed in.348  The courts should address 
blockbuster questions of this kind after appropriate deliberation, 
argument, and briefing. 
Balancing tests invite judges to base their decisions on the relative 
weight of a particular person’s interest in seeking or avoiding 
procreation.  These decisions can send a message that the Constitution 
generally does or does not recognize a particular right without giving 
courts the best possible opportunity to consider the many issues in play 
in the ART context. 
Balancing approaches also invite judges to impose their own views 
about an individual’s desire to be (or not to be) a parent.  As the history 
considered here suggests, judges focus on the strength of the reasons 
people have in making parenting decisions.349  In debate about 
abortion, judges weighed people’s sexual histories, lifestyles, attitudes 
about parenting, and life plans.350  Prejudices can affect the judgments 
of courts applying a balancing analysis.  These prejudices lead to 
                                               
 346. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, No. 15CA0990, 2016 WL 6123561, at *6–7 
(Colo. App. Oct. 20, 2016) (finding husband’s interest in not producing offspring to 
outweigh wife’s desire in having another child); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 716–19 (N.J. 
2001) (holding wife’s desire to avoid biological parenthood outweighed husband’s 
interest in using embryos); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992) 
(finding husband’s interest in avoiding parenthood outweighed wife’s interest in 
donating unused embryos). 
 347. See, e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1162–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) 
(holding the wife’s interest in using embryos after becoming infertile outweighed 
husband’s interest in not becoming a biological parent); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 
1140–42 (Pa. 2012) (same). 
 348. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. Adashi, Embryo Disposition Disputes:  Controversies 
and Case Law, 46 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 13–14, 16, 18 (July–Aug. 2016), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/hast.600. 
 349. See supra notes 327–335 (detailing the issues with the inconsistent application 
of the balancing test following ambiguities in the Whole Woman’s Health decision). 
 350. See supra notes 153–159 (noting a woman’s hesitation to testify due to questions 
about her sexual history and the subsequent subpoena of her physician). 
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unpredictable results and to highly unfair outcomes.  Someone’s 
ability to become a parent—or avoid unwanted parenthood—should 
not depend so much on judges’ personal proclivities and evaluations 
of the parties’ characters. 
The history studied here further suggests that balancing approaches 
fail to deliver the kind of clarity that parties need when making vital 
reproductive decisions.  When pro-lifers championed men’s rights, the 
outcome in court depended on the stories told by individual parties and 
the ideological predisposition of individual judges.351  Following Whole 
Woman’s Health, courts have also reached clashing decisions, reading the 
facts differently and disagreeing about the relative weight of the 
different factors to be balanced.  Individuals and couples using ART 
need legal guidance about the likely consequences of deeply important 
personal decisions.  Balancing approaches will not likely do the job. 
A.   Lessons from Family Law Contracting 
Due to the potentially significant inefficiencies that are inherent 
when using the balancing approach, a better alternative must be found 
when analyzing ART cases.  In looking for strategies for improvement, 
we should look at the rules governing contracting in family law, 
including those covering premarital agreements, mid-marriage 
contracts, separation agreements, and surrogacy contracts.  Of course, 
embryo-disposition agreements are quite different from some of these 
family law contracts.  Separation agreements, for example, come into 
a play after a relationship is over when a couple lays out how they want 
to handle matters from marital property division to child custody.352  
By contrast, couples routinely enter into embryo-disposition 
agreements before a pregnancy takes place and when a romantic 
relationship between partners is ongoing.353 
Surrogacy agreements are also dissimilar from embryo-disposition 
contracts.  In most states, surrogacy is legal only under limited 
circumstances, such as when a couple is unable otherwise to bring a 
                                               
 351. See supra notes 148, 183 and accompanying text (discussing the impact that a 
personal story can have on a judge). 
 352. See, e.g., BRIAN H. BIX, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW:  FAMILY LAW 
150 (2013) (explaining that courts tend to favor separation agreements over marital 
agreements since separation agreements are made knowing that divorce is imminent 
and the parties will likely not be “clouded by romantic feelings”). 
 353. See, e.g., Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Factors that Affect Infertility Patients’ Decisions About 
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1623, 1629 (June 2006) (explaining 
that most clinics require consent forms to be filled out at the onset of treatment). 
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pregnancy to term or only for couples rather than individuals.354  
Surrogacy agreements thus focus partly on avoiding the legal missteps 
that could otherwise void a contract.  There are fewer laws limiting 
access to IVF or regulating the disposition of excess embryos,355 and 
embryo-disposition contracts do not seem to touch on some of the 
concerns some hold about surrogacy, including the psychological risks 
for surrogates and the exploitation of poor, non-white women as 
gestational carriers.356  As important, surrogacy agreements deal 
primarily with the relationship between respective parental rights of the 
intended parents and the gestational carrier.357  Embryo-disposition 
contracts, by contrast, should center on the wishes of the intended 
parents and the relationship between them. 
B.   A Model for Contracting 
While mid-marriage and premarital agreements both deal with 
issues related to those in embryo-disposition contracts, prenuptial 
contracts offer the best analogy.  Couples enter into mid-marriage 
agreements in some states when one spouse is contemplating 
divorce.358  The agreements change the terms of property division 
                                               
 354. See Intended Parents:  Surrogacy Laws by State, SURROGATE.COM, 
https://surrogate.com/intended-parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legal-information/surr 
ogacy-laws-by-state (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Intended Parents]. 
 355. One of the most significant statutory controversies surrounding IVF involves 
the variation in state laws on insurance coverage for infertility treatments.  See, e.g., 
Sean Rossman, What Your Sexuality, Age and Location Have to Do with Your IVF Coverage, 
USA TODAY (Apr. 24, 2017, 9:39 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-
now/2017/04/22/what-your-sexuality-age-and-location-have-do-your-ivf-coverage/100594874. 
 356. There are plenty of concerns surrounding surrogacy.  See, e.g., MARTHA FIELD, 
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1993); BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING 
MOTHERHOOD:  IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 237 (1989); 
CHRISTINE OVERALL, HUMAN REPRODUCTION:  PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, POLICIES 113 
(1993); JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS:  REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE 
BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S FREEDOM 68 (1994); Anita L. Allen, The Black Surrogate Mother, 8 
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 17, 31 (1991) (raising racial concerns connected with the use of 
surrogacy and advocating alternately for a ban on surrogate contracts or refusal to 
enforce surrogate contracts); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE 
L.J. 293, 333–34 (1998); A.M. Capron & M.J. Radin, Choosing Family Law over Contract 
Law as a Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, 16 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 34, 36 (1988). 
 357. See Intended Parents, supra note 354. 
 358. See, e.g., Pacelli v. Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56, 58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) 
(exemplifying a case where a plaintiff sought advice of counsel for mid-marriage 
agreement when contemplating divorce).  States have been more reluctant to enforce 
agreements when a contract is not made in contemplation of divorce.  See John Tingley 
& Nicholas B. Svalina, Postnuptial Agreement Not Made in Contemplation of Imminent 
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upon divorce and serve as a means of reconciling the parties.359  While 
both mid-marriage and embryo-disposition agreements come into play 
during intact relationships, the circumstances surrounding the forging 
of these contracts can be quite different.  Some courts tolerate mid-
marriage agreements, often called reconciliation contracts, as a way to 
avoid divorce.360  Couples entering embryo-disposition contracts will 
not often be contemplating separation or divorce.361  Indeed, before 
IVF begins, couples may be unduly optimistic about the outcome of 
ART procedures and the future of a romantic relationship.362  The 
threat of abuse inherent in each type of agreement is also different.  
Courts have criticized mid-marriage agreements because one partner 
can leverage another’s attachment to an existing union to get a more 
favorable property settlement.363  Embryo-disposition agreements 
more often raise concerns because partners will not have thought out 
possible contingencies or vital legal consequences.364 
Prenuptial agreements and embryo-disposition contracts cover the 
most common ground.  Couples often enter into these types of 
contracts before forging a legal relationship—when either partner 
might have trouble anticipating changing circumstances.  Optimism 
bias might affect those entering into either type of agreement, and 
since those forming either kind of agreement are usually in a 
                                               
Divorce Affecting Property Rights on Separation or Divorce, in 2 MARITAL PROPERTY LAW § 27.8 
(2d ed. Supp. 2015). 
 359. See, e.g., Abigail Trafford, A Mid-Marriage Change in the Rules May Make Sense, 
WASH. POST (May 27, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2008/05/23/AR2008052302562.html (explaining that one of the goals of the 
postnuptial agreement is for estate planning). 
 360. See, e.g., id. (identifying that some couples use mid-marriage agreements to 
“heal” a marriage). 
 361. See, e.g., Deborah Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce, and Family Law 
Contracting:  A Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 431 (2013) 
(finding that because “couples entering into pre-marital contracts often suffer from 
optimism bias,” they “seldom believe they will fall into divorce). 
 362. See, e.g., id. 
 363. See, e.g., Pacelli, 725 A.2d at 59 (explaining that a spouse can coerce a partner 
into signing a mid-marriage agreement by threatening “the destruction of a family and 
the stigma of a failed marriage”). 
 364. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 5, at 66–89 (summarizing research suggesting that 
IVF participants do not fully grasp the consequences of their decisions or the impact 
of informed-consent forms provided by clinics). 
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functioning relationship, the parties to such an agreement will trust 
one another and not bargain at arms’ length.365  
The legal treatment of prenuptial agreements provides a starting point 
for a new approach to embryo-disposition contracts.  Some states still treat 
all prenuptial agreements as inherently suspect, but many others honor 
such contracts if certain procedural and substantive safeguards are in 
place.366  States have attached special importance to “due process in 
formation . . . and certain minimal standards of substantive fairness.”367  
The most recent draft of the Uniform Premarital and Marital 
Agreements Act (UPMAA) offers a starting point for states searching for 
a better approach to embryo disposition.368  Under the UPMAA, a written 
premarital agreement signed by both parties is unenforceable if the party 
against whom enforcement is sought can prove one of the following:  the 
agreement was involuntary or the result of duress, the party seeking 
enforcement did not have access to legal counsel, or the agreement was 
signed without full financial disclosure by one of the parties.369  As an 
alternative to legal counsel, the party seeking enforcement can point to a 
notice of waiver of rights or a plainly written explanation of the rights and 
responsibilities changed by the contract.370  Independently of these 
procedural requirements, courts can refuse to enforce a term in the 
agreement if, taken in the context of the agreement as a whole, the term 
                                               
 365. See Smith, supra note 21, at 208, 213 (discussing optimism bias in pre-marital 
relationships); Forman, supra note 361, at 431 (explaining that couples entering into 
pre-marital contracts specifically often suffer from optimism bias). 
 366. See J. Thomas Oldham, With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow, or Maybe Not:  A 
Reevaluation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act After Three Decades, 19 DUKE J. GENDER 
L. & POL’Y 83, 83–84 (2011).  Some states require full disclosure of financial 
information or require that each party have access to counsel.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 46b–36g (2018) (requiring “fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, 
character and value of property, financial obligations and income of the other party” 
and a “reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel” before a 
prenuptial agreement will be enforced); see also Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial 
Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 838–39 (2007) (comparing various states’ 
requirements for enforceable prenuptial and postnuptial agreements). 
 367. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/premarital%20and%20marital%20agree
ments/2012_pmaa_final.pdf. 
 368. See id. at 1–2. 
 369. Id. § 9(a). 
 370. Id. § 9(a)(3). 
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was unconscionable at the time of signing371 or enforcement of the term 
imposes substantial hardship on one party.372 
Underlying the provisions of the UPMAA are several core assertions.  
First, the procedural focus of the act reflects a belief that independent 
counsel or an alternative “is crucial for a party waiving important legal 
rights.”373  The substantive dimensions of the UPMAA deal both with the 
threat to economically-vulnerable parties and with outcomes that do not 
even roughly correlate with the parties’ contributions to a marriage.374  
Courts have looked at a variety of factors in measuring unconscionability.375 
Unconscionability does not seem relevant to embryo-disposition 
agreements.  Courts view some contracts as unconscionable partly 
because prenuptial agreements deal so heavily with money.376  If 
enforcing an agreement will make one party dependent on the state for 
support, for example, states often bar enforcement.377  Embryo-
disposition agreements do not deal with the division of financial assets.  
Anxieties about the poverty of one party common to prenuptial agreements 
will not arise in the context of embryo-disposition agreements. 
                                               
 371. Id. § 9(f). 
 372. Id. § 9(g). 
 373. Id. § 9 cmt. 
 374. See id. (explaining that when analyzing marital agreements, courts tend to look 
at a number of financial factors, including the contributions made by each spouse and 
the potential disparity that may arise if an agreement is enforced). 
 375. Id. (“[D]uration of the marriage, the purpose of the agreement, the current 
income and earning capacity of the parties, the parties’ current obligations to children 
of the marriage and children from prior marriages, the age and health of the parties, 
the parties’ standard of living during the marriage, each party’s financial and 
homemaking contributions during the marriage, and the disparity between what the 
parties would receive under the agreement and what they would likely have received 
under state law in the absence of an agreement.”). 
 376. Russ Alan Prince, How to ‘Bust’ Prenuptial Agreements, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2018, 7:22 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/russalanprince/2018/04/04/how-to-bust-prenuptial-
agreements. 
 377. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g(b) (1995) (“If a provision of a premarital 
agreement . . . causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for support under a 
program of public assistance . . . a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, 
may require the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid such 
eligibility.”); FL. STAT. § 61.079(7)(b) (2018); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West 
1997) (following the format of the UPMAA); O’Daniel v. O’Daniel, 419 S.W.3d 280, 
284 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]here is also a near universal exception which 
precludes specific enforcement of such agreements if enforcement would deny to one 
spouse support that he or she cannot otherwise obtain and therefore result in that 
spouse becoming a public charge.”). 
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Courts can also view agreements as unconscionable because they do 
not reflect the contributions of each partner to a marriage.378  The law 
of both marital property and spousal maintenance turns on the idea that 
marriage is a partnership; each partner’s treatment after the dissolution 
of a relationship mirrors what that person added to the partnership.379  
The same principles do not govern embryo-disposition agreements. 
However, the concerns about informed consent animating the 
UPMAA resonate powerfully on in the context of embryo disposition. 
Rarely do couples starting IVF consult a lawyer.380  Any explanation of 
the rights imposed or waived by an agreement may be buried deep in 
page-long forms that couples can easily miss.381 
Of course, when parties sign most contracts, ignorance of the terms 
of an agreement is not a defense.382  But in the case of either embryo 
disposition or marriage, the stakes are considerably higher.383  Indeed, 
when it comes to embryo disposition, constitutional rights may be in 
play.  As important, the parties to both kinds of agreement are not as 
likely to defend themselves, trusting unduly in their partner and 
exaggerating the odds of a favorable outcome. 
By passing a model statute, states can make clear ex ante what the 
parties need to do to ensure that courts will enforce an agreement.  
Moreover, in mandating that agreements satisfy certain procedural 
requirements, states can increase the odds that couples using IVF will 
understand the gravity of embryo-disposition decisions. 
1. The model statute 
First, states should demand that embryo-disposition agreements be 
voluntary.  In the context of premarital contracts, courts have defined 
                                               
 378. See, e.g., Lane v. Lane, 202 S.W.3d 577, 583–84 (Ky. 2006) (finding an 
prenuptial agreement unconscionable since it did not factor the wife’s important 
contributions to the marriage as a homemaker); see also Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 
509–10 n.11 (Ohio 1984). 
 379. See, e.g., JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 73–84 (2014) (exploring 
the ways courts determine marital contributions by each party, focusing specifically on 
the economic contributions). 
 380. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 5, at 76, 85. 
 381. See, e.g., id. at 76. 
 382. See, e.g., Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875) (“That the defendant did 
not read the charter and by-laws . . . was his own fault.  It will not do for a man to enter 
into a contract, and, when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did 
not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained.”). 
 383. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 5, at 70 (citing a 2011 study that showed substantial 
evidence that embryo disposition decisions are “extremely difficult” to make). 
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voluntariness in radically different ways.384  All states treat agreements 
as involuntary if one couple used physical violence to coerce another 
into signing on.385  Other states go further, treating an agreement as 
involuntary if one partner presents it in the days immediately before a 
wedding when it would be embarrassing, emotionally difficult, or 
financially trying to refuse to sign.386  Which of these approaches makes 
the most sense in the context of embryo disposition?  If a couple must 
enter into a contract before beginning IVF, there is nothing suspect 
about forging an agreement shortly before a procedure begins.  
Nevertheless, more extreme forms of duress, including domestic 
violence, can shape the terms of an agreement, and courts should void 
any contract resulting from it. 
Second, states should require those entering into an embryo-
disposition agreement to have both access to independent counsel and 
a full disclosure of the rights created or destroyed by different 
disposition decisions.  Access to counsel, in turn, should mean time to 
identify appropriate representation.  As an added safeguard, the 
agreement itself should spell out the ramifications of each disposition 
decision.  Courts should resort to a balancing analysis only if an 
agreement fails one of these enforcement criteria. 
Such a model statute is far from perfect.  Just as is the case with 
prenuptial agreements, embryo-disposition agreements can come 
before the courts years after their original signing.  Given the delay 
between contract formation and enforcement, it is hard for the parties 
to anticipate changing circumstances.  As the Witten Court notably 
pointed out, people routinely change their minds about matters as 
intimate as embryo disposition, and a model statute would still hold 
                                               
 384. See, e.g., Judith T. Younger, Lovers’ Contracts in the Courts:  Forsaking the Minimum 
Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 349, 359–400 (2007). 
 385. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (AM. LAW INST. 2018). 
 386. Compare In re Marriage of Bernard, 204 P.3d 907, 910–13 (Wash. 2009) (en banc) 
(finding agreement not enforceable when significantly revised version of premarital 
agreement was presented a day before the wedding), and Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 644 
N.W.2d 197, 205–07 (N.D. 2002) (finding agreement presented three days before 
wedding to be “involuntary” and emphasizing the absence of independent counsel and 
adequate financial disclosure), with Brown v. Brown, No. 2050748, 19 So. 3d 920 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2007) (finding assent to agreement presented day before wedding to be 
“voluntary”), aff’d sub. nom, Ex parte Brown, 26 So. 3d 1222, 1223–27 (Ala. 2009), and 
Binek v. Binek, 673 N.W.2d 594, 596–98 (N.D. 2004) (finding agreement sufficiently 
“voluntary” to be enforceable despite being presented two days before the wedding); see 
also Mamot v. Mamot, 813 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Neb. 2012) (summarizing five-factor test 
many courts use to evaluate “voluntariness” under the UPMAA). 
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the parties to a contract that may not reflect their present-day feelings 
about procreation.387  Inevitably, some couples will not enter into any 
agreement or will disregard the consequences written into a contract.  
After all, those beginning IVF are likely to be optimistic about both 
their relationship to one another and the success of ART and may not 
take seriously warnings about what an agreement truly entails. 
Just the same, a model statute would represent a significant 
improvement—one that has advantages that other alternatives do not.  
Many of the informed-consent documents on which courts have relied 
are not designed to deal with disputes between the parties using IVF.  
There is evidence that parties cannot easily digest the information in 
lengthy forms and almost never have the assistance of counsel in doing 
so.388  Putting some guardrails in place will improve the odds that 
contracts reflect the informed consent of both people who have 
created embryos. 
The model statute also will deliver fairer outcomes than the mutual, 
contemporaneous consent approach recommended in Witten.  Ideally, 
the disposition of embryos would always reflect the consensus of both 
embryo creators in the present day.  In practice, however, embryo-
disposition disputes arrive in court because creators cannot arrive at 
any such agreements.389  A mutual, contemporaneous consent 
approach systematically disfavors the person seeking to use the 
embryos.390  Such a result may not best capture any common ground 
between the creators. 
Other scholars have argued that courts should always side with a party 
avoiding, rather than seeking, procreation.391  There are sound 
                                               
 387. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003). 
 388. See Forman, supra note 5, at 67, 76, 85. 
 389. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text (detailing the contemporaneous 
consent approach used in Witten). 
 390. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
contemporaneous consent approach inherently favors the party vying for the “status quo”). 
 391. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, No. 15CA0990, 2016 WL 6123561, at *6–7 
(Colo. App. Oct. 20, 2016) (holding husband’s desire not to procreate outweighed 
wife’s intention to use embryos, since husband may feel a “moral and social obligation” 
to the biological child, even if no legal obligation would exist should the implantation 
be successful); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 718 (N.J. 2001) (rejecting husband’s request 
to use embryos, since doing so would force wife to become a biological parent against 
her will); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (finding husband’s desire 
to avoid procreation outweighed wife’s desire to donate embryos, since “[d]onation, 
if a child came of it, would rob him twice—his procreational autonomy would be 
defeated and his relationship with his offspring would be prohibited). 
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arguments in support of this point.392  However, since the contours of the 
rights to seek or avoid procreation remain unclear, the relative weight—
and boundaries—of the rights tied to genetic parenthood deserve much 
further consideration before a court adopts a one-size-fits-all approach to 
ART disputes.  As judges hash out the constitutional rights in play in 
embryo-disposition cases, courts should honor the informed, written 
wishes of those mostly deeply affected by embryo disposition. 
CONCLUSION 
The front-page fight between Vergara and Loeb is just the most 
notorious of the many battles about the disposition of embryos.  The 
courts have developed a number of approaches to these disputes, but 
most have followed Kass, looking for a valid contract and applying a 
balancing test if no such agreement can be found.  In practice, balancing 
analyses continue to play a vital role in embryo-disposition struggles.  
Possible contracts—often informed-consent documents covering the 
relationship between a clinic and a couple—may not address the most 
important issues in embryo disposition.  Although states have adopted 
different versions, balancing analyses generally ask courts to weigh each 
individual’s interest in seeking or avoiding genetic parenthood. 
In the past, balancing tests have played a central role in determining 
who has rights in the context of reproduction.  Balancing approaches can 
send a powerful message about the relative weakness of the constitutional 
rights at stake in assisted reproduction.  Balancing analyses also play to the 
prejudices of judges about the character of individual litigants and the 
relative merits of seeking or avoiding parenthood.  Moreover, balancing 
almost always guarantees uncertain outcomes, making it much harder for 
couples to plan out their reproductive futures. 
Looking to other family law contracts, particularly those governing 
prenuptial agreements, provides guidance about how to improve the 
odds that couples will make an informed, thoughtful decision about the 
future of the embryos they create.  Better contracts will hardly deliver 
perfect results.  But the fate of embryos is politically, personally, and 
ideologically important.  It is imperative that the law better encourages 
people to take embryo-disposition decisions as seriously as they should. 
                                               
 392. See supra note 391. 
